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HEIGHTENED ENABLEMENT IN THE UNPREDICTABLE ARTS

Sean B. Seymore
A bedrock principle of patent law is that an applicant must sufficiently disclose
the invention in exchange for the right to exclude. Essential to the disclosure
requirement is enablement, which compels a patent applicant to enable a person
having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) to make and use the full scope of the
claimed invention without undue experimentation. Enablement may be insufficient
when the applicant claims an invention broadly with a dearth of supportingdata or
examples. This is problematic in unpredictable fields like chemistry because a
PHOSITA often needs a specific and detailed teaching in order to practice the
full scope of the claimed invention. Yet the current patent examinationframework
allows a patentee to obtain a broad claim encompassing millions of compounds
enabled by a trivial amount of supportingdisclosure. Such broad patent scope can
have a chilling effect on other scientists who are seeking to make and use the
claimed invention while the inventor does not know how to do so. In an effort to bridge
the disconnect between patent law and the experimental sciences, I propose a new
approachto establishingthe primafacie case of nonenablementfor patent applications in
the unpredictablearts. After examining the PHOSITA's role in the enablement analysis, I elucidate the problems with the current framework for the enablement
inquiry, propose a new framework, and explain why it mitigates problems with the
currentframework. I conclude by discussing some of the concerns raised by the proposed framework and explain how the proposed approachmitigates these concerns.
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INTRODUCTION

The claims are the most important part of a patent because they define
the scope of the patentee's right to exclude.' Claim scope is central to every
facet of patent law.2 During patent prosecution,' applicants dicker with the
1.
See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257
(Fed. Cit. 1989) ("A claim in a patent provides the metes and bounds of the right which the patent
confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using, or selling the protected invention.");
Rhone-Poulenc Specialties Chimiques v. SCM Corp., 769 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cit. 1985)
("The claim defines the scope, or limits, of the right to exclude conferred by the patent.").
Donald Chisum explains the importance of claims and how they set forth the parameters
2.
of the invention:
Claims measure the invention for determining patentability both during examination and
after issuance when validity is challenged. They also determine what constitutes
infringement. A claim recites a number of elements or limitations, and will cover or "read
on" only those products (or processes) that contain all such elements or limitations.
Effective claims must be neither too broad (i.e., cover the prior art or matter not adequately
described in the specification) nor too narrow (i.e., fail to cover all possible embodiments
of the applicant's invention).
1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, Glossary at Gl-3 (2008). Indeed, claims "are central
to virtually every aspect of patent law." Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim
Terms, 104 MICH. L. REv. 101, 101 (2005); see also Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and
Interpretationof Claims-American Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L., 497,
499 (1990) (stating that in patent law, "the name of the game is the claim").
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U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to obtain an expansive exclusory
right;' and in litigation the parties try to convince the court to construe the
claims in their favor.
A bedrock principle of patent law is that an applicant must sufficiently
disclose' the invention in exchange for the right to exclude.' Thus, the scope
3.
Patent law consists of several branches. Patent prosecution describes the process by
which an inventor, usually through the help of an attorney, files an application with the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (FTO) for examination. The application contains essentially the same
elements as an issued patent, including a written description, drawings, and claims. The patent
prosecutor's interaction with the patent Examiner is ex parte. See generally ALAN L. DURHAM,
PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS § 5 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining patent prosecution). Patent litigation
focuses on issued patents. A patent owner whose rights have been infringed can compel an accused
infringer to stop the infringing activity and pay for damages arising from the infringement that has
already occurred. See id. § 11. On the other hand, a potential infringer can launch a "preemptive
strike" against the patentee to seek a declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid. Id. Finally,
patent licensing allows patent owners to generate royalty income by allowing others to practice
the invention.
4.
During patent prosecution the Examiner must afford claims their broadest reasonable
interpretation. See In re Bass, 314 F.3d 575, 577 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("In examining a patent claim, the
FTO must apply the broadest reasonable meaning to the claim language, taking into account any
definitions presented . . . .").
5.
Claim construction is key in a patent infringement suit. A suit is often a bifurcated
proceeding, where the court first determines the meaning and scope of the patent claims, and then
compares the construed claims to the allegedly infringing device or method. See Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (finding that claim
construction is a matter of law), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1315 (Fed. Cit. 2005) (en banc) (articulating the principles of claim construction).
6.
The statutory disclosure requirement has four parts, which appear in the first and second
paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 112:
The specification shall contain a uritten description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and
distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (emphasis added). Note that "specification" refers to the written description
and the claims. See id. ("The specification shall contain a written description . . . [and] shall
conclude with one or more claims . .. ."). Nevertheless, the terms "written description" and
"specification" are often used interchangeably (and mistakenly) in patent law. DONALD S. CHISUM
ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 156 n.4 (3d ed. 2004).

7.
The Court often describes disclosure as the quid pro quo for the inventor's right to
exclude. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("[The patent system represents a
carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and
useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time."). In
return for the right to exclude, the patent laws "impose upon the inventor a requirement of
disclosure. To insure adequate and full disclosure so that upon the expiration of the [patent term]
'the knowledge of the invention enures to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to
practice it and profit by its use."' Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974)
(quoting U.S. v. Dubliner Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933)). Interestingly, the disclosure
requirement can be traced back at least five centuries to the Venetian Patent Statute of 1474, which
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of the claims is closely tied to the amount of information that the applicant
discloses in the patent application. Essential to the disclosure requirement is
enablement," which compels a patent applicant to enable a person having
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) to make and use the full scope of the
claimed invention without undue experimentation.! Enablement, therefore,
places an outer limit on the scope of the claims.'o
Enablement problems may arise when the applicant claims an invention
broadly with a dearth of supporting data or examples. In such cases, the
applicant often argues that the PHOSITA can rely on the ordinary level of
skill in the art to fill in the gaps omitted from the disclosure." This reasoning
presents a problem in unpredictable fields like chemistry because a PHOSITA
cannot fill in the gaps easily. For example, a chemist usually cannot extrapolate
the result from one chemical reaction to predict how another chemical will
react with any reasonable expectation of success.1 Yet the current patent
examination framework allows a patentee to obtain a broad claim encompassing
millions of compounds enabled by a trivial amount of supporting disclosure.
And since a patentee never bears an affirmative burden of proving enablement,

obliged "[a] person who shall build any new and ingenious device ... not previously made ... [to]
give notice of it to the office of our General Welfare Board when it has been reduced to perfection
so that it can be used and operated." Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J.PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 166, 177 (1948) (reprinting the statute); see also Craig Allen Nard & Andrew
P. Morriss, Constitutionalizing Patents: From Venice to Philadelphia,2 REV. L. & ECON. 223, 233309 (2006) (examining the "constitutionalization" of patent systems, including the Venetian statute, the
English Statute of Monopolies of 1624, the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and
the U.S. Patent Act of 1790).
8.
See LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cit. 2005)
(describing enablement as the essential aspect of the patent bargain). Although the enablement
requirement is closely related to the "written description" requirement of § 112 9 1, they are
separate and distinct. In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995-96 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (holding that when an
applicant attempts to claim specific chemical compounds which were broadly disclosed, the
question is not enablement, but "whether the specification discloses the compound ... specifically, as
something [the applicant] actually invented"). In any event, the two requirements often "rise and
fall together" because "a recitation of how to make and use the invention across the full breadth
of the claim is ordinarily sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor possesses the full scope of the
invention, and vice versa." LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1345.
9.
See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing the judicially created undue experimentation requirement).
10.
The scope of the claims must "be less than or equal to the scope of the enablement."
Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, the scope of enablement is the sum of what is taught in the specification plus what
is known by a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) without undue experimentation. Id.
See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("[Tlhe
11.
specification need not necessarily describe how to make and use every embodiment of the invention
'because the artisan's knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill in the gaps."').
12.
See infra Part 1.B.2 (discussing experimentation in the unpredictable arts).
13.
See infra Part 11.B (discussing the problems with the current framework).
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neither in prosecution" nor in litigation," he can sidestep the requirement.
The problem here is that undue patent scope can have a chilling effect on
other scientists who are trying to elucidate how to make and use the claimed
invention while the inventor does not know how to do so.
The issue I address in this Article, the inability of the patent laws to
contend with enablement in the unpredictable arts, actually points to a
broader disconnect between patent law and the experimental sciences.
Unlike engineering and the applied technologies, unpredictable fields like
chemistry do not lend themselves to speculation. Inventions in these fields
often require confirmation through experiment, which means that a patent
without working examples often becomes an invitation to experiment.
In an effort to bridge the disconnect between patent law and the
experimental sciences, I propose a new approach to establishing the prima
facie case of nonenablement for patent applications in the unpredictable arts.
Part I begins by examining the PHOSITA's role in the enablement analysis.
Here I also explain the distinction between the predictable and unpredictable
arts. In Part II, I elucidate the problems with the current framework for
the enablement inquiry, propose a new framework, and explain why it mitigates
problems with the current framework." Part III identifies potential concerns raised by the new framework and discusses how the proposal mitigates
these concerns.

During prosecution, the Examiner must prove nonenablement because the disclosure
14.
is presumed to be sufficient. In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
15.
During litigation, the patent challenger must prove nonenablement by clear and
convincing evidence. Morton Int'l v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
("The court correctly required [defendant] to prove by clear and convincing evidence facts
establishing lack of enablement."); see also Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802
F.2d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[The presumption [of validity] remains intact and [the burden of
proof remains] on the challenger throughout the litigation, and the clear and convincing
standard does not change.").
16.
See infra Part II.B (exploring problems with the current framework).
17.
This Article is the first to propose a new approach to the burden of proof required to make
and to sustain a rejection for nonenablement in unpredictable technologies during patent
prosecution. One commentator has discussed the policies and statutory requirements of disclosure
as well as the complications particular to the unpredictable arts. See Brian P. O'Shaughnessy, The
False Inventive Genus: Developing a New Approach for Analyzing the Sufficiency of Patent Disclosure
Within the UnpredictableArts, 7 FORDIAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 147 (1996). Another
commentator presents a pre-Federal Circuit doctrinal analysis of the sufficiency of disclosure
challenges more generally, without emphasis on unpredictable technologies. See Edward C.
Walterscheid, Insufficient Disclosure Rejections (Part 1), 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 217 (1980) (discussing
burdens of proof); Edward C. Walterscheid, Insufficient Disclosure Rejections (Part V), 62 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 387 (1980) (discussing enablement).
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1.

COMPARING THE ENABLEMENT INQUIRY INTHE PREDICTABLE
AND THE UNPREDICTABLE ARTS

Although the patent statute does not distinguish between different
fields of invention," technology matters in patent law, particularly in
the enablement context. Indeed, the level of skill in the relevant art
"is [the] prism or lens through which a judge, jury, or the Board [of Patent
Appeals and Interferences]l 9 views the prior art and the claimed invention."o
Further, the judiciary encourages applicants to omit from the written
description21 that which is well known in the art.22 But deciding what
the PHOSITA knows, and whether the PHOSITA can fill in gaps omitted
from the written description, lies at the heart of the enablement inquiry.
A.

The Enablement PHOSITA

1.

The Historical PHOSITA: An Unsophisticated "Plodder"

The PHOSITA is a hypothetical construct of patent law akin to the
reasonably prudent person in torts.23 Factors relevant to constructing
18.
The U.S. Patent Act is essentially technology-neutral on its face, although several
commentators argue that it is technology-specific in application. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1654-55 (2003) (exploring the pros and cons of a
technology-specific system); William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond
to This Judicial Invention?, 59 FLA. L REV. 229, 323-28 (2007) (same). But Congress added a technologyspecific provision to the nonobviousness section of the statute in 1997. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2000)
(addressing biotechnological processes). Interestingly, technological distinctions are prohibited
by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which states
that patent rights shall be "enjoyable without discrimination as to... the field of technology."
TRIPS art. 27(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IC, Legal Instruments--Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81, 93-94 (1994).
19.
An applicant whose claims have been twice rejected by the Examiner may appeal to the Board
of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board). 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). The Board reviews adverse decisions of
Examiners and determines priority of invention among contesting parties. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). The
Board can affirm a rejection or reverse and remand to the examining corps. 37 C.F.R. § 1.197 (2007)
(promulgating Patent Office regulations pertaining to the Board). An applicant dissatisfied with a Board
decision can appeal to the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. § 141.
20.
Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
21.
The written description is the part of the patent application (or issued patent) that completely
describes the invention.
22.
See Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("A patent
need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art."). "He may begin at the point where
his invention begins, and describe what he has made that is new, and what it replaces of the old. That
which is common and well known is as if it were written out in the patent and delineated in the drawings."
Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580,586 (1881).
23.
See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (explaining that
a PHOSITA "is not unlike the 'reasonable man' and other ghosts in the law"). For an in-depth analysis of
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the PHOSITA in a particular technical field include the sophistication of the
technology and the educational level of active workers in the field.24 Unlike
inventors and patentees, whom the patent law presumes to have extraordinary
skill," the patent law views the PHOSITA as simply a user of the technology.
The enablement PHOSITA26 has historically been viewed not an
innovator, but rather a "plodder."" "If the enablement PHOSITA
shows any problem-solving ability, it is in tapping the prior art to fill
in gaps left by the inventor's disclosure."28 But even under the plodder
view, the educational background and experience imputed to a PHOSITA varies
substantially within2 9 and across30 disciplines. Indeed, the PHOSITA's precise
the PHOSITA concept, see generally John 0. Tresansky, PHOSITA-The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person
in Patent Law, 73 J.PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 37 (1991); Joseph P. Meara, Comment,]ust Who Is the
PersonHaving Ordinary Skill in the Art? PatentLw's Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REV. 267 (2002).
See Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696-97 (Fed. Cit. 1983) (listing
24.
six factors relevant to a determination of ordinary skill which also include the educational level of
the inventor, the types of problems encountered in the art, prior art solutions to those problems,
and the rapidity with which innovations are made).
25.
Judge Giles S. Rich describes the difference between a PHOSITA and an inventor:
Inventors, as a class ... possess something ... which sets them apart from the workers of ordinary
skill.... A person of ordinary skill in the art is also presumed to be one who thinks along the
line of conventional wisdom in the art and is not one who undertakes to innovate ....
Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also N. Am. Vaccine,
Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1580 (Fed. Cit. 1993) (Rader, J., dissenting) (explaining
that "inventors generally have extraordinary skill"); Dan L Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law
Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1189 (2002) ("Unlike the inventor, who almost
by definition is presumed to be one of extraordinary skill, the PHOSITA standard contemplates some
median or common level of skill." (internal citation omitted)); Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in
Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J.GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 183, 189-90 (2006) ("Far from being one
of ordinary skill, the inventor is by definition one of extraordinary skill, so that once the mental work
has been completed, all that remains to be done has been characterized as the work of the mere
artisan-not the work of an inventor." (internal citation omitted)).
26.
There is also a nonobviousness PHOSITA. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). Unlike the
enablement PHOSITA, the nonobviousness PHOSITA "is legally presumed to know all of the relevant
prior art." In re Kleinman, 484 F.2d 1389, 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973). For a discussion of other
similarities and differences between the enablement PHOSITA and the nonobviousness PHOSITA,
see Burk & Lemley, supra note 25, at 1185-1202, and Tresansky, supra note 23, at 52-54.
See Standard Oil, 774 F.2d at 454 (noting that a PHOSITA "is not one who undertakes to
27.
innovate"); Edited & Excerpted Transcript of the Symposium on Ideas Into Action: Implementing Reform
of the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1053, 1060 (2004) (presenting Rebecca Eisenberg's
views of the "plodder presumption" in case law); Douglas Y'Barbo, Is Extrinsic Evidence Ever Necessary
to Resolve Claim Construction Disputes?, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y, 567, 605 (1999) ("[Ilt
is bedrock proposition of patent law that the PHOSITA is not an innovator (but an applicator).").
28.
Burk & Lemley, supra note 25, at 1190.
Compare Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F3d 1286, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming the
29.
district court's finding that a PHOSITA in pharmacology has either "an advanced degree in pharmacy,
biology, chemistry or chemical engineering and at least two years of experience [with the subject] ... or a
bachelor's degree in one (or more) of those fields plus five years of experience with such technology"), with
Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 F3d 1476,1481 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (accepting the parties' contention
that a PHOSITA formulating pharmaceutical compositions "is a person with an M.D. or Ph.D.").
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identity is crucial to enablement because this legal concept is the prism
through which one evaluates the adequacy of the disclosure."
2.

The PHOSITA After KSR v. Teleflex

As discussed above, the courts have viewed the enablement PHOSITA
as an unimaginative and uncreative person. In the case of nonobviousness,
on the other hand, the inquiry is traditionally what would lead a PHOSITA
to combine teachings of the prior art in order to arrive at the claimed
invention." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit) and its predecessor court" resolved the question with the "teaching,
suggestion, or motivation" (TSM) test, which deemed a patent claim obvious
if some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings could
be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of
the PHOSITA."
However, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc. recently held that the Federal Circuit's rigid application of the TSM
test is inconsistent with the "expansive and flexible" approach to the
nonobviousness question set forth in prior precedent." A critical flaw with
30.
See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1125
(Fed. Cit. 2000) (affirming the district court's finding that a PHOSITA in cigarette design has "a
bachelor's degree in either engineering, chemistry, physics, or chemical engineering, and would have
had at least five years experience in the field of cigarette design"); Dow Chem. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 816 F.2d 617, 618 (Fed. Cit. 1987) (noting that a PHOSITA in industrial chemistry "would be
a Ph.D. chemist with industrial experience").
31.
See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
32.
See Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1356-57 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., noted "the
importance of identifying 'a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in
the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does' in an obviousness
determination" (quoting KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1731 (2007))).
33.
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the U.S. Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.). See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.). The successor court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(Federal Circuit), adopted the C.C.P.A. decisional law as binding precedent. See South Corp. v.
United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cit. 1982) (en banc) ("As a foundation for decision in this
and subsequent cases in this court, we deem it fitting, necessary, and proper to adopt [the holdings of
the C.C.P.A.] as precedent.").
34.
See, e.g., In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355-56 (Fed. Cit. 1998) (explaining the TSM
test); In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956-57 (C.C.P.A. 1961) ("The mere fact that it is possible to find
two isolated disclosures which might be combined in such a way to produce a new compound does
not necessarily render such production obvious unless the art also contains something to suggest the
desirability of the proposed combination.").
35.
See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739 (2007). "We begin by rejecting
the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals. Throughout this Court's engagement with the question
of obviousness, our cases have set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way
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the TSM test is the assumption that a PHOSITA lacks the creative ability
to combine the teachings of the prior art:
[The Federal Circuit erred] in its assumption that a person of
ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those
elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem.. . . Common
sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have obvious uses
beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of ordinary
skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like
pieces of a puzzle ... . A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton.

... When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a
problem and there are a finite number of identified, predictable
solutions, a person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known
options within his or her technical grasp. . . .
Thus, the post-KSR PHOSITA is not a plodder but a creative individual."
If KSR also implicates the enablement PHOSITA's abilities, Examiners
may have a harder time proving nonenablement. After all, an applicant
could assert that the super-smart, post-KSR PHOSITA can readily fill in any
gaps omitted from the disclosure. At least in the predictable arts," it appears
that the Federal Circuit will not embrace this view." Nonetheless, the
court's path in unpredictable fields remains uncertain.40

the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here." Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1
(1966); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1851)).
36.
KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742 (emphasis added).
For additional perspectives on the post-KSR PHOSITA, see Joseph Scott Miller,
37.
Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237 (2008).
38.
Predictable fields include applied technologies like electrical and mechanical engineering,
and the unpredictable fields include the experimental sciences like chemistry and biotechnology.
This classification presupposes that the electrical and mechanical arts lack unpredictable factors, and
that the chemical arts lack predictability. Judge Giles S. Rich criticized this and advocated an
alternative classification. See In re Bowen, 492 F.2d 859, 861-62 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (noting that "we
do not think it hinges on whether the case is denominated 'chemical' or 'mechanical').
39.
See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
40.
Judge Moore's opinion in a recent nonprecedential opinion suggests that the court may
adopt a "full scope" enablement framework in both predictable and unpredictable technologies. See
PhannaceuticalRes., Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 253 Fed. Appx. 26, 31 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (affirming the
district court's grant of summary judgment that in the highly unpredictable field of making flocculated
suspensions of megestrol acetate, three working examples did not provide an enabling disclosure
commensurate in scope to cover a broad claim to "a surfactant," which was construed to cover any
and all surfactants).
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B.

Distinguishing the Predictable and the Unpredictable Arts

1.

The Predictable Arts

Historically, the judiciary has not required a specific and detailed teaching
for inventions in applied technologies like electrical and mechanical engineering because they are rooted in well-defined, predictable factors." In electrical
engineering, for example, a PHOSITA can easily predict what will happen when
circuits are combined. Similarly, a PHOSITA in mechanical engineering
can use thermodynamics to predict how much power a new engine will
produce." A simple hypothetical example illustrates this point:
[A] specification for the invention of chopsticks would contain
a description of two sticks of a given range of sizes, how sticks of
appropriate dimensions could be made, and how the sticks would
be positioned in the hand to be used for eating. Even if the claims
were broad enough to include chopsticks with pointed and rounded
tips, as well as other possible combinations of features, the above
specification would be sufficiently enabling for the ordinary utensil
manufacturer to produce the invention as claimed.
Until recently, an applicant in the predictable arts rarely needed to show
more than one embodiment to enable a broad claim." The courts upheld the
broad claim even if it read on other embodiments which were inadequately
disclosed because applicants in predictable technologies, at least in the eyes of
the court, could ordinarily rely on the knowledge of a PHOSITA to fill in
46
gaps in the written description.

See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the requisite level of
41.
disclosure for an invention involving predictable mechanical or electrical elements is less than that
required for the unpredictable arts).
See, e.g., JOHN D. CUTNELL & KENNETH W. JOHNSON, PHYSIcS 577-619 (6th ed. 2004)
42.
(explaining electrical circuits).
43.
See id. at 416-49 (explaining the laws of thermodynamics).
Karen S. Canady, The Wright Enabling Disclosure for Biotechnology Patents, 69 WASH. L.
44.
REV. 455, 457 (1994).
45.
The patentee is "generally allowed [broad] claims, when the art permits, which cover more
than the specific embodiment shown." In re Vickers, 141 F.2d 522, 525 (C.C.P.A. 1944) (emphasis
added); see also Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(holding that a patent need only disclose a single embodiment to satisfy enablement).
In re Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 735 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining that patent claims can and do
46.
cover vast numbers of inoperative embodiments "so long as it would be obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the relevant art how to include those factors in such manner as to make the embodiment
operative rather than inoperative").
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Possibly as a result of KSR, however, the Federal Circuit has started to police
enablement more carefully in the predictable arts." For example, in Automotive
Techs., Int'l v. BMW," the court determined that a disclosure which enabled
mechanical side-impact sensors was insufficient to support a broad claim
encompassing both mechanical and electronic sensors because the two were
"distinctively different."' This reflects a recent interest in "full scope" enablement
which has appeared in other recent predictable-art cases, suggesting a single
embodiment is no longer sufficient to enable a PHOSITA in these fields.so
2.

The Unpredictable Arts

In contrast to the applied sciences, the judiciary has required more
detailed disclosure in chemistry and the experimental sciences." This
requirement exists because the field of organic chemistry, for example,
"is essentially an experimental science [where] results are often uncertain,
unpredictable, and unexpected."5 2 Indeed, a PHOSITA cannot predict
if a reaction protocol which works for one compound will work for others."
See supra note 40.
47.
48.
Auto. Tech. Int'l, Inc. v. BMW, 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
49.
Id. at 1283-85.
See, e.g., Sitrick v. DreamWorks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 1000-03 (Fed. Cit. 2008)
50.
(determining that a disclosure which enabled video games did not support a broad claim that covered
movies as well as video games); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1379-80 (Fed.
Cit. 2007) (determining that a disclosure which enabled an injector with a pressure jacket was
insufficient to support a claim that covered injectors both with and without a pressure jacket). The
Federal Circuit intimated its adoption of full scope enablement a few years before KSR. See AK Steel
Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cit. 2003) (explaining that a written description
which only described a single embodiment of the invention, using aluminum with a certain percentage of
silicon, failed to enable claims covering embodiments with other percentages of silicon).
51.
The Federal Circuit has held that inventions in unpredictable technologies in early stages of
development require "a specific and useful teaching." Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d
1361, 1367-68 (Fed. Cit. 1997). This requirement exists because in these fields the PHOSITA often "has
little or no knowledge independent from the patentee's instruction." Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363
F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cit. 2004).
52.
Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F.2d 428, 433 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Chiron Corp. v.
Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cit. 2004) ("The law requires an enabling disclosure for
nascent technology because a person of ordinary skill in the art has little or no knowledge independent
from the patentee's instruction.").
53.
Attorney-scientist Karen Canady provides a hypothetical example from biotechnology:
[A]n inventor develops a strategy for solving a class of problems, but has yet to demonstrate
success in all applications within that class. Although the strategy may seem logical
enough that one would expect it to succeed wherever applied, the unpredictability of
biology raises doubts about this expectation. Difficulties arise because trial and error is
normally required before a biologist can know which applications of a given strategy will
succeed. Thus, it is difficult to distinguish between claimed inventions that solve an entire
class of problems and those whose applicability is more limited.
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Thus "the well-known unpredictability of chemical reactions [is] enough to
create a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of a particular broad statement
put forward as enabling support for a claim."" There is a danger that
embodiments not described either cannot be made or may require experimentation which is unduly extensive."
The well-known case of In re Fisher illustrates this point.56 The applicant
in the case attempted to claim a hormone preparation which included all
polypeptides having at least 24 amino acids of a specified sequence and
purity.57 The written description disclosed only a polypeptide with 39 amino
acids and disclosed no products, inherently or expressly, containing other
than 39 amino acids." The C.C.P.A. affirmed the Board's conclusion that
the written description did not enable a PHOSITA to make a hormone with
other than 39 amino acids without undue experimentation:
[TIhe scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of
enablement provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the
art.... In cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical
reactions and physiological activity, the scope of enablement obviously
varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability of the factors involved.5 9
Canady, supra note 44, at 458. In the field of chemistry, a PHOSITA cannot even predict if a
reaction protocol which works for one species will work for that same species on a larger scale.
Laboratory chemists know that some reactions just do not scale up well, for reasons that are unknown.
54.
In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971). An alternative test for enablement
is to determine if a skilled scientist would have believed that the inventor's success with the
described embodiment(s) "could be extrapolated with a reasonable expectation for success" to other
embodiments encompassed by the broad claims. In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
One jurist explained the reasonableness in detail:
[W]ith respect to generic claims to chemical and biological inventions, the scope of
the claims is limited to what those skilled in the art could reasonably predict from the
inventor's disclosure. This precept recognizes that one skilled in these chemical and
biological arts cannot always reasonably predict how different chemical compounds
and elements might behave under varying circumstances. Thus, in so-called "chemical"
patent law practice, the claims of a patent are limited by the scope of what the disclosure
reasonably teaches to one skilled in the art.
Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 458 F. Supp. 828, 839 (M.D. Fla. 1976), afTd, 584 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.
1978). Important considerations include "the type[s] of reactions, the state of the art, the representative
nature of the examples, and the breadth of the claims." In re Rainer, 377 F.2d 1006, 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
55.
See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(explaining that "lelnablement is lacking ... because the undescribed embodiments cannot be made,
based on the disclosure ... without undue experimentation"); In re Prutton, 200 F.2d 706 (C.C.P.A.
1952) (holding that claims to a class of chemical compounds which were sufficiently broad to
involve some speculation lack enablement notwithstanding the presence of the operative specific
examples within the class).
56.
In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
57.
See id. at 835.
58.
Id. at 836.
59.
Id. at 839.
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To hold otherwise would allow a patentee with nonenabled claims to dominate
the future patentable inventions of others.' But even though the judiciary
recognizes the unique challenges that inventions in the unpredictable arts bring
to the patent system, it has struggled to adapt the old doctrinal framework of
the patent laws to meet these challenges.
II.
A.

RETHINKING THE PRIMA FACIE CASE OF NONENABLEMENT

The Current Framework

As an initial matter, a patent application is presumed to be enabled
when it is filed." The burden of proof is on the PTO to show unpatentability, not on the applicant to establish patentability, and "it remains on the
PTO even if the [Examiner] has made a prima facie case" of unpatentability.62
60.
See id. Similarly, In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1993), illustrates the potential
impact of an insufficiently supported claim on science and medicine. The written description included a
single working example that taught the production of a vaccine-conferring immunity in chickens against
a RNA tumor virus. However, the applicant attempted to claim "any and all live, non-pathogenic vaccines,
and processes for making such vaccines, which elicit immunoprotective activity in any animal for toward
any RNA virus." Id. at 1562. The court determined that the appealed claims would have provided broad
patent rights for vaccines directed toward AIDS and leukemia. In affirming the Board's rejection, Judge
Giles S. Rich noted that the disclosure of a single working example should be viewed as an invitation to
experiment to determine whether the applicant's teaching could be extrapolated to other RNA viruses. Id.
at 1560-62; cf. In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786, 789 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (determining that the applicant's
disclosure, which lacked a single specific example or embodiment, fell into the category of "an invitation to
experiment" in order to determine how to make the alleged invention).
61.
See In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining that the PTO must
accept the applicant's disclosure "as in compliance with the enabling requirement of [N112 9 11
unless there is reason to doubt the objective truth of the statements contained therein that must be
relied on for enabling support"); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Accordingly,
applicants should not have been required to substantiate their presumptively correct disclosure to
avoid a rejection under the first paragraph of § 112."). Judge S. Jay Plager suggests that the
presumption of enablement emanates from the judiciary's liberal interpretation of the patent statute:
Logic would dictate that when an applicant seeks a grant of property from the government
the applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to that grant. That, however, is
not the rule in patent law; the rule is that the burden of persuasion is on the FFO to show
why the applicant is not entitled to a patent ....
Perhaps the explanation lies in the way that the statute is written: "A person shall be
entitled to a patent unless-." 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). Whether a different rule would
prevail if the statute said, "To be entitled to a patent, an applicant shall establish ... " is a
question that purists can debate. Whatever the case, the rule is now well established.
In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cit. 1994) (Plager, J., concurring).
62.
Paul R. Michel, The Challenge Ahead: Increasing Predictability in Federal Circuit
Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1249 (1994) (citing In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d
1531, 1532 (Fed. Cit. 1993) (explaining that an Examiner must affirmatively prove unpatentability);
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cit. 1992) (same)). Therefore, "[i]f the claimed invention is
patentable, the applicant is entitled to a patent (because the statute says so)-not eventually, but as
soon as patentability can be determined." Id.
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If the Examiner suspects that one or more claims lack enablement, he or
she must first construe the claims to determine their scope." Claim construction
includes defining terms that are ambiguous or are not well known in the art,
while simultaneously giving the claims the broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the written description.6 In the rejection, the Examiner
must explicitly set forth the meaning of the terms and the scope of the
claim." Further, the Examiner must establish that the rejection is proper by a
preponderance of the evidence."
To establish a prima facie case of nonenablement, the Examiner "bears
an initial burden of setting forth a reasonable explanation as to why [he or
she] believes that the scope of protection [sought in] that claim is not
adequately enabled by the description of the invention provided in the"
written description.6 ' The Examiner must "explain why [he or she] doubts
the truth or accuracy of any statement" and "back up [these assertions] with
acceptable evidence or reasoning which is inconsistent with the contested

63.

See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING

PROCEDURE, § 2164.04 (8th ed. 6th rev. 2007) [hereinafter MPEP] (instructing Examiners
to construe claims before analyzing enablement); see also In re Volk, 634 F.2d 607, 610 (C.C.P.A.
1980) ("Though an applicant has a right to claim what 'he' regards as his invention under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, it is a function of the examiner to construe the claims presented.").
64.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
65.
MPEP, supra note 63, § 2164.04.
66.
In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that patent applications are
not entitled to the procedural advantages of the 35 U.S.C. § 282 statutory presumption of validity,
which means that the standard of proof required to reject a patent claim is lower than that required
to invalidate a patent).
67.
In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also In re Armbruster, 512 F.2d
676, 677 (C.C.P.A. 1975). Judge Pauline Newman describes the burden shifting that takes place
in patent prosecution:
The prima facie case is a procedural tool of patent examination, allocating the
burdens of going forward as between examiner and applicant. The term "prima face case"
refers only to the initial examination step.... [T]he examiner bears the initial burden,
on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case
of unpatentability. If that burden is met, the burden of coming forward with evidence or
argument shifts to the applicant.
After evidence or argument is submitted by the applicant in response, patentability is
determined on the totality of the record, by a preponderance of evidence with due
consideration to persuasiveness of argument.
If examination at the initial stage does not produce a prima facie case of unpatentability,
then without more the applicant is entitled to grant of the patent.
In reviewing the examiner's decision on appeal, the Board must necessarily weigh all
of the evidence and argument. An observation by the Board that the examiner made a
prima facie case is not improper, as long as the ultimate determination of patentability is
made on the entire record.
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
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statement."' The Examiner bears this burden "even when there is no
evidence in the record of operability' without undue experimentation."
The Examiner must write the rejection to point out specifically how
the written description fails to teach a PHOSITA how to make and
use the claimed invention without undue experimentation," or how the
enablement provided is not commensurate in scope with the protection
sought by the claims.72 The Examiner must support rejections with
references." In certain cases the Examiner can even use a post-filing date
reference as evidence of nonenablement. For example, the Examiner can
use a post-filing date reference as evidence to support his contention that a
PHOSITA could not possibly practice the disclosed invention until months
68.
In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 224 (C.C.P.A. 1971); see also In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559,
1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Plager, J., concurring) ("One function of the PTO's prima facie case practice
is to force the PTO examiners to set forth specific objections, which can be met by the applicant, and
not just to make a general rejection.").
69.
The utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 mandates that any patentable invention be
useful and, accordingly, the subject matter of the claim must be "operable." See Raytheon Co. v.
Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 956 (Fed. Cit. 1983) (explaining that a claim is inoperative when
it requires an unattainable result). Lack of utility or operability and lack of enablement are
closely-related grounds of unpatentability. See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d
1350, 1358-59 (Fed. Cit. 1999) (providing illustrations). Nonetheless, an applicant's assertion of
operability creates a presumption that is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement. In re Langer,
503 F.2d 1380, 1391 (C.C.P.A. 1974); accord In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
70.
MPEP, supra note 63, § 2164.04 (emphasis added) (citing In re Brana, 51 F.3d at 1566)
(explaining burden shifting in the utility context, which mirrors the enablement analysis). These
cases make clear that neither the unpredictable nature of the art nor the possibility that the claims
read on a substantial number of inoperative embodiments lowers the Examiner's initial burden:
In the field of chemistry generally, there may be times when the well-known
unpredictability of chemical reactions will alone be enough to create a reasonable doubt as
to the accuracy of a particular broad statement put forward as enabling support for a claim.
This will especially be the case where the statement is, on its face, contrary to generally
accepted scientific principles. Most often, additional factors, such as the teachings in
pertinent references, will be available to substantiate any doubts .... [In any case,] it is
incumbent upon the Patent Office, whenever a rejection on this basis is made, to explain
why it doubts the truth or accuracy of any statement [with evidence or reasoning].
Otherwise, there would be no need for the applicant to go to the trouble and expense of
supporting his presumptively accurate disclosure.
Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 223-24 (citations omitted).
71.
See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("Although the statute does not say
so, enablement requires that the specification teach those in the art to make and use the invention
without 'undue experimentation'." (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cit. 1988))); see
also infra Part II.B.4 (discussing the judicially created undue experimentation requirement).
72.
In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1971) ("The relevant inquiry may be
summed up as being whether the scope of enablement provided to one of ordinary skill in the art by
the disclosure is such as to be commensurate with the scope of protection sought by the claims.").
73.
Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 224; see also In re Brebner, 455 F.2d 1402, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1972)
(holding that the PTO must provide a factual basis for a lack of enablement rejection, rather than
conclusory statements as to the level of ordinary skill in the art).
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or years after the filing date." However, in the case of an application
which claims priority to an earlier-filed application, the Examiner cannot
use a reference to show lack of enablement based on later developments in
the art."
Next, after the Examiner establishes a prima facie case of nonenablement, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut the prima facie case with
"persuasive arguments, supported by suitable [evidence] where necessary, that
one skilled in the art would be able to make and use the claimed invention
using the application as a guide."" As previously noted, the claims must be
enabling as of the filing date of the application,n which means that the
applicant cannot supplement an insufficient disclosure." However, the applicant
can supply post-filing date references as evidence of the level of predictability
in the art as of the filing date."
Finally, the Examiner "must then weigh all the evidence before [him],
including the specification and any new evidence supplied by [the] applicant
with the evidence and/or sound scientific reasoning previously presented in
the initial rejection and decide whether the claimed invention is enabled.""o
Examiners must make the determination on the weight of all the evidence
and not on personal opinion." An applicant who has been twice rejected
can appeal."

74.
MPEP, supra note 63, § 2164.05(a); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(affirming the Board's decision that an article published five years after the effective filing date
established that the art was sufficiently unpredictable that a PHOSITA would not believe that the
applicant's success with one embodiment could be extrapolated to others).
75.
See In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (explaining that since the applicant's
effective filing date establishes enablement, references supplied to demonstrate later changes in the
state of the art are impermissible).
76.
MPEP, supra note 63, § 2164.05 (citation omitted); see also Marzocchi, 439 F.2d at 223.
77.
See In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (holding that sufficiency is judged
as of an application's filing date); see also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362,
1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explaining that in both patent prosecution and litigation the enablement
determination "is made retrospectively, i.e., by looking back to the filing date of the patent application
and determining whether undue experimentation would have been required to make and use the claimed
invention at that time").
78.
Glass, 492 F.2d at 1232 (explaining that an applicant cannot supplement an application
with later publications that add to the knowledge of the art so that the disclosure, supplemented by

such publications, would suffice to enable the practice of the invention).
79.
See Hogan, 559 F.2d at 605 ("This court has approved use of later publications as evidence
of the state of art existing on the filing date of an application." (citation omitted)); Enzo, 188 F.3d at
1374 n.10 ("In view of the rapid advances in science, we recognize that what may be unpredictable
at one point in time may become predictable at a later time." (citation omitted)).
80.
MPEP, supra note 63, § 2164.05.
Id.
81.
82.
See supra note 19 (explaining appeal procedures).
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Identifying the Problem With the Current Framework

1.

Constructive Reduction to Practice
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In contrast to the canons for scientific research and publishing, an inventor
can obtain a patent without conducting a single experiment." It is well
settled in U.S. patent law that conception," and not any physical act,
is the "touchstone" of inventorship." Thus, an applicant who constructively
reduces an invention to practice by merely filing a patent application
presumably has complied with the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.86 This legal fiction is an artifact of the patent law's historical roots in
predictable technologies."

83.
Judge Pauline Newman has described the role of constructive reduction to practice in
patent law:
"Constructive reduction to practice". is a legal status unique to the patent art. Unlike
the rules for scientific publications, which require actual performance of every experimental
detail, patent law and practice are directed to teaching the invention so that it can be
practiced. The inclusion of constructed examples in a patent application is an established
method of providing the technical content needed to support the conceived scope of
the invention.
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cit. 2003) (Newman, J.,
dissenting); cf. Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The mere fact that
something has not previously been done clearly is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for rejecting all
applications purporting to disclose how to do it." (quoting In re Chilowsky, 229 F.2d 457, 461
(C.C.P.A. 1956)).
84.
Conception "is the formation, in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent
idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is thereafter to be applied in practice." Cooper v.
Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
85.
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
("Conception is the touchstone of inventorship, the completion of the mental part of invention.").
According to the Supreme Court:
The primary meaning of the word "invention" in the Patent Act unquestionably refers
to the inventor's conception rather than to a physical embodiment of that idea. The
statute does not contain any express requirement that an invention must be reduced to
practice before it can be patented. Neither the statutory definition of the term in § 100 nor
the basic conditions for obtaining a patent set forth in § 101 make any mention of
"reduction to practice."
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1998).
86.
See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cit. 1986)
("Constructive reduction to practice occurs when a patent application on the claimed invention is
filed."). The courts admit that constructive reduction to practice is legal fiction. See, e.g., Elan
Pharms., Inc. v. Mayo Found., 346 F.3d 1051, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Borst, 345 F.2d
851, 855 (C.C.P.A. 1962)). Nevertheless, constructive reduction to practice is an established
method of disclosure. See, e.g., Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir.
2006); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 926 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
87.
See William D. Noonan, PatentingMedical Technology, 11 J.L. MED. 263, 264-69 (1990)
(presenting a historical perspective of the patent system's "engineering bias").
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Implicit in this legal fiction is the assumption that a PHOSITA can use
the written description to practice the invention:
[Tihe inventor is in some sense speculating or guessing about the features
of an invention not yet built. But even [so], the underlying assumption
in patent law is that the inventor "has" the invention mentally,
and so can give a sufficiently detailed description of that inventive
conception-physically creating the invention is straightforward."
However, unlike engineering and the applied sciences, unpredictable fields
like chemistry do not lend themselves to speculation. Accepted scientific
practice dictates inventions in these fields often require confirmation through
experiment, which means that the written description without working
examples often becomes an invitation to experiment.
2.

Prophetic Examples

As noted above, under the current framework, compliance with the
enablement requirement does not turn on whether an inventor discloses
working examples. 90 This presents a problem in unpredictable fields like
chemistry where the array of chemical compounds which are structurally
similar may differ radically in their properties.9 1 As an alternative to working
examples, courts allow inventors to satisfy enablement in other ways,
including the disclosure of "prophetic" examples: These are "forms of the
invention that the patentee did not actually invent but which would be within
the scope of [his or] her disclosure." 92
Prophetic examples present several problems for enabling inventions in
unpredictable fields. First, in the experimental sciences, a PHOSITA cannot
extrapolate a result from one particular embodiment across a broad genus
88.
Burk & Lemley, supra note 25, at 1174 n.77.
89.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
90.
See In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (explaining that there is no
statutory basis for a working example requirement); In re Long, 368 F.2d 892, 894-95 (C.C.P.A.
1966) (same).
In cases involving "chemical compounds, many of which of course differ radically in their
91.
properties, it must appear in the specification . . . that 'the chemicals or chemical combinations
included therein were generally capable of accomplishing the desired result."' In re Walker, 70 F.2d
1008, 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (citation omitted).
Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REv. 123, 158 (2006).
92.
Prophetic examples do not automatically make a patent nonenabling. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The key benefit of prophetic
examples is their use in provisional patent applications, which are applications used to obtain an
early filing date for an invention before the applicant is ready to draft a claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 111.
But the provisional application must include a specification which satisfies the requirements
of § 112. See New Railhead Mfg. v. Vermeer Mfg., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294-95 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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with a reasonable expectation of success. 3 This is true, for example, because
minor changes in structure can result in large changes in reactivity.4 Second,
when no actual experiments are disclosed, there is a danger that the claimed
invention cannot be made or is inoperative.95 Third, a patent supported with
prophetic examples poses the danger of rewarding an inventor with undue
patent scope. As Timothy Holbrook points out, "[ulndue patent scope could
have a chilling affect on others who may actually be investigating how to
create the prophetically claimed invention when the inventor herself may
not be able to do so."96 The chilling effect also ripples downstream because
the patent becomes prior art, which is presumptively enabled. 97
3.

Generic Claims

A generic claim uses structural formulas" or functional language to
cover embodiments that share a common attribute. 99 This style of claiming
pervades the chemical and pharmaceutical arts,"se and affords the broadest
93.
See supra Part I.B.2.
94.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
95.
Claims are not necessarily invalid if they read on inoperative embodiments because "[ilt is
not a function of the claims to specifically exclude ... possible inoperative substances." Atlas Powder,
750 F.2d at 1576 (quoting In re Dinh-Nguyen, 492 F.2d 856, 858-59 (C.C.P.A. 1974)). But, "if the
number of inoperative combinations becomes significant, and in effect forces one of ordinary skill
in the art to experiment unduly in order to practice the claimed invention, the claims might indeed
be invalid." Id. at 1576-77 (citation omitted); see also Durel Corp. v. Osram Sylvania Inc., 256 F.3d
1298, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (determining that if the accused infringer could have shown that a
"significant percentage" of embodiments with the scope of claims were inoperable, "that might have
been sufficient to prove invalidity").
96.
Holbrook, supra note 92, at 158.
97.
See In re Sasse, 629 F.2d 675, 681 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (holding that a reference to a patent as prior
art is presumptively enabled and operable, and describing how an applicant can rebut the presumption),
cited with approval in Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("In patent prosecution the examiner is entitled to reject application claims as anticipated by a prior art
patent without conducting an inquiry into whether or not that patent is enabled .... .").
98.
See In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1249 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (explaining that the practice of
describing a class of chemical compounds in terms of structural formulas, where the substituents are
recited in the claim language, has been sanctioned by the courts). This style of claiming is called
Markush practice. See In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d 716, 719-20 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (explaining the history
and current law of Markush practice). A Markush claim is an alternative claim format which allows
an applicant to define a genus or subgenus by enumeration of species. See generally V.I. Richard,
Claims Under the Markush Formula, 17 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 179 (1935) (presenting a pre-Harnisch
comprehensive reviews of the history of Markush claiming); Richard L. Kelly et al., Markush Claims,
37 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 164 (1955) (same); Edward C. Walterscheid, Markush Practice Revisited, 61 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 270 (1979) (same).
99.
See MPEP, supra note 63, § 806.04(d) (defining a generic claim).
100.
Applicants often draft broad claims to sweep within their ambit every conceivable functionality
that might show the desired reactivity. See generally Lucille J. Brown, The Markush Challenge, 31 J.CHEM.
INFo. COMPUTIER Sci 2 (1991) (discussing the widespread use of Markush structures in chemical patents);
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claim scope under the patent laws.'' Indeed, a single generic claim can easily
encompass millions, 02 billions,o3 or novemdecillions'" of compounds.
Generic claims create several problems which the current framework
cannot solve. First, when a generic method claim covers millions of
embodiments, as they frequently do, enablement across the entire genus
becomes suspect:
Generic structures are allowed under the premise that a compound
as a whole will exhibit specific activity regardless of what is substituted
on the basic molecule. Clearly, where variable structure represents
greater than three or four or ten million compounds, it is unreasonable
to expect that so many compounds will exhibit activity similar to the
activity shown by substances for which practical data is supplied.'o
Yet the patentee never bears the burden of specifically identifying which
species work."
Second, generic claims are hard to examine. They often read on a genus
where the species have disparate properties or lack a common core structure.'
This disparity complicates and necessarily lengthens the Examiner's search,
which in turn delays prosecution.'" In the words of one experienced
Examiner, dealing with generic claims is like "living under the national debt

G.W.A. Milne, Very Broad Markush Claims; A Solution or Problem? Proceedings of a Round-Table Discussion
Held on August 29, 1990,31 J.CHEM. INFO. COMPUTER SCL 9 (1991) (same).
See Brown, supra note 100, at 2-3 (discussing the widespread use of generic structures in
101.
chemical patents and the broad protection they convey).
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,801,613 (filed June 17, 1987). Claim 1 recites "[a] modified
102.
bradykinin type peptide having the formula A-Arg-B-C-D-W-X-Y-Z-Arg," wherein A, B,
C, D, W, X, Y, Z are each generic substructures reciting smaller peptides or amino acids. Thus, the
primary generic structure contains eight smaller generic substructures. See id., col. 19 1.21-37. All
together, this claim covers 10,235,904 formulations of a peptide.
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,838,925 (filed Sep. 25, 1987) (including a broad generic
103.
claim which covers billions of compounds).
For an extreme example, see Bis-Benzo or Benzopyrido Cyclo Hepta Piperidene,
104.
Piperidylidene & Piperazine Compounds & Compositions, European Patent No. 0,535,152 (filed
June 21, 1991). One commentator conservatively calculates that the number of compounds covered
by the patent is at least one novemdecillion (which is 10 followed by 60 zeroes). See Mario Franzosi,

Markush Claims in Europe, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 200, 200 (2003).
Brown, supra note 100, at 3.
105.
106.
See supra Part II.A.
See Milne, supra note 100, at 11-12 (explaining the difficulty in examining Markush107.
type generic claims).
The slowdown drains the resources of the PTO, delays the prosecution of other applications in
108.
queue, and consequently postpones the introduction of the claimed invention and other inventions
into the marketplace. Some possible solutions include charging applicants incrementally for the
Examiner's search time or for the number of embodiments encompassed by the claims. See id.
(presenting various solutions to generic claiming).
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or with [a] teenager."" He further explains that the courts and the patent
bar have struck down inventive solutions which have emerged from the
examining corps:
Beginning about 1970, we tried to apply the appropriate
statutes.... [For example,] we rejected the claims in many applications
for not having an enabling disclosure for making all of the compounds ....
There is a strong presumption of [enablement, which favors the
applicant].... Over the decade of 1970-1980, the courts pretty much
went against us. It is rare now for an examiner to be sustainedfor making
enablement-type rejections against a broad[generic] claim.
Around 1980, we decided to change our approach .... [For example,
in 1986 we proposed raising examination fees to be commensurate in
scope with the work involved, which the patent bar rejected.] We are
now left with a situation where we don't have many tools to handle
these [generic] claims.'
As I discuss below, time pressures and the PTO's incentive system makes it nearly
impossible for an Examiner to rigorously examine a complex generic claim.'
Third and relatedly, the cumulative effect of the PTO's burden of proof,
constructive reduction to practice, prophetic examples, and the Examiner's
time pressures, and is that the present system is hard pressed to prevent
a patentee from using generic claims to obtain protection which far exceeds
the disclosure provided. From a scientific standpoint, as discussed above,
undue patent scope can have a chilling effect on other scientists who are
trying to elucidate how to make and use the claimed invention while the
inventor does not know how to do so."'
4.

What Constitutes "Undue Experimentation"

An enabling disclosure must teach a PHOSITA how to practice the
claimed invention without "undue experimentation."" This judicially
created doctrine seeks to determine if undue experimentation is required to
practice the invention as of the filing date of the patent application."' The
109.

Id. at11.

110.
Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added).
111.
See infra Part II.B.6.
112.
See text accompanying supra note 96.
113.
See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("The term 'undue experimentation'
does not appear in the statute, but it is well established that enablement requires that the
specification teach those in the art to make and use the invention without undue experimentation."
(citation omitted)); accord In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Wands, 858
F.2d at 737).
114.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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Federal Circuit considers a nonexhaustive list of factors to answer this
question. These factors include (1) the nature of the invention, (2) the
breadth of the claims, (3) the level of predictability of the art, (4) the quantity
of experimentation necessary, (5) the presence or absence of working
examples, (6) the amount of direction presented, (7) the prior art, and (8)
the relative skill of those in the art."' These factors are, at least in principle,
quite sensitive to the nature of the art. The presence of factors (2), (5), and
(8) make it clear that elucidating what constitutes undue experimentation is
the linchpin of the enablement inquiry in the experimental sciences.
This view of what constitutes undue experimentation fails to recognize the realities of the experimental sciences and points to the larger issue of the
disconnect between the judicial bench and the laboratory bench. To illustrate
the nature of this disconnect, consider first that in the eyes of the judiciary, a
large quantity of experimentation is not necessarily undue:
The determination of what constitutes undue experimentation in
a given case requires the application of a standard of reasonableness,
having due regard for the nature of the invention and the state of the
art. The test is not merely quantitative, since a considerable amount of
experimentation is permissible, if it ismerely routine, or if the specification
in question provides a reasonable amount of guidance with respect to the
direction in which the experimentation should proceed. . . ."'

In re Angstadt further illustrates this point."' The broad claims at issue,
which read on thousands of species, covered a method for catalytically
transforming a class of organic compounds. Although the applicant disclosed
forty examples, the Board agreed with the Examiner that the specification left
"too much to conjecture, speculation and experimentation" and was insufficient
to support the broad claim because: (1) the forty examples did not teach
across (and were not representative of) the entire genus; and (2) the written
description did not disclose those factors which would allow a PHOSITA to
produce the claimed product."' Yet the panel majority reversed, explaining
that requiring a more detailed disclosure had drawbacks:
To require such a complete disclosure would apparently necessitate a patent application or applications with "thousands" of
115.

See Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. In subsequent cases, the court determined that the Wands

factors are illustrative and not mandatory. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200,

1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[I]t is not necessary that a court review all the Wands factors to find a
disclosure enabling. . . ."). "What is relevant depends on the facts ..... Id.
116.

Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (citations omitted).

117.
118.

In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
Id.at 501-02.
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examples .... More importantly, such a requirement would force an
inventor seeking adequate patent protection to carry out a prohibitive
number of actual experiments. This would tend to discourage inventors
from filing patent applications in an unpredictable area since the
patent claims would have to be limited to those embodiments which
are expressly disclosed."
The unfortunate consequence is that a PHOSITA wanting to practice the
invention must bear the task of engaging in time-insensitive experiments to
figure out which catalysts work and which catalysts do not work.
Second, within the realm of unpredictable arts, the Federal Circuit's
willingness to deem experimentation undue appears to vary across the
experimental sciences."z In newer fields like biotechnology, the Federal
Circuit appears more willing to deem experimentation undue,"' possibly
because the judges themselves do not understand the underlying science."'
Id. at 502-03 (citation omitted).
119.
In other words, there are degrees of unpredictability. See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.
120.
Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming a district court's determination that
antisense technology was highly unpredictable and that the teachings provided virtually no
disclosure of the practice of antisense in cells other than E. coli, and concluding that the breadth of
enablement was not commensurate in scope with the claims because the quantity of experimentation
required to practice antisense in cells other than E. coli as of the filing date would have been undue).
See Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
121.
("Where, as here, the claimed invention is the application of an unpredictable technology in the
early stages of development, an enabling description in the specification must provide those skilled in
the art with a specific and useful teaching."); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254
(Fed. Cir. 2004) ("The law requires an enabling disclosure for nascent technology because a person of
ordinary skill in the art has little or no knowledge independent from the patentee's instruction."); In
re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (affirming the Board's determination that as of the
applicant's filing date, the claimed methods for the biotechnological invention were "fraught with
unpredictability" and "would have required extensive experimentation that would preclude
patentability"); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495-96 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (affirming the Board's
determination that the applicant's limited disclosure could not teach a PHOSITA how to practice
the invention with undue experimentation due to the relatively incomplete understanding of the
biology of cyanobacteria as of appellants' filing date, the corresponding high level of unpredictability,
and the breadth of the claims).
Several commentators suggest that the Federal Circuit and other courts hearing patent
122.
cases may not understand the science that they encounter. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 25, at
1197 ("Even the Federal Circuit, which does not suffer nearly so much from these limitations, is not
in a position to fully understand all of the science it encounters."). One jurist openly described the
problem faced by the appellate bench:
Appellant's specification is long and complicated, and such explanation of operation as is
given is expressed in language which. . .is not comprehensible, although the physical
structure itself is capable of being understood. The specification does not conform to any
scientific or engineering principles of which we have been able to obtain any knowledge.
Should we reverse the experts and grant the patent sought, it would be a "leap in the dark,"
so far as this court is concerned, and we would be entirely unable to say what the patent is
really for, or what measure of protection appellant is receiving. We have no way of ascertaining
whether the device .. . will do the things claimed for it.
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By contrast, the court seems more willing to permit a high level of experimentation in older technologies like chemistry.12 1 Whether this is due to the
judiciary's comfort with chemistry or the accumulation of a substantial body of
chemical patent cases, the inherent unpredictability of science and the trial-anderror approach to research must be accounted for in any enablement analysis.
5.

The Inability to Test Enablement Post-Issuance

A PHOSITA cannot test enablement in a patent post-issuance without
risking infringement. Although a common law experimental-use exception
to infringement for testing and verifying the patented invention can be
traced back to the early nineteenth century," in a handful of opinions the
Federal Circuit has essentially nullified the doctrine. 125 As a result, a
PHOSITA probably cannot experiment with the patented technology without
In re Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965, 966 (C.C.P.A. 1931). Arti Rai suggests that the Federal Circuit should
defer to the technical expertise of the FTO in certain circumstances:
The amount of technical knowledge that an appellate court can wield-even a specialized
court like the Federal Circuit-is quite limited. To be sure, the Federal Circuit has a few
judges who are technically trained. Federal Circuit judges are also assisted by a small
technical staff and by law clerks who generally have both legal training and some technical
background. Nonetheless, technically adept judges, a small technical staff, and technically
adept clerks are not-and indeed could not be-trained in every area of science or
technology in which patent disputes might arise. Moreover, because scientific knowledge is
highly localized, training in one area of science or technology simply does not transfer into
other areas. By contrast, the PTO has thousands of patent examiners with training in
multiple different fields of technology. In the area of biotechnology alone, for example, the
PTO has over 150 Ph.D.s.
Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 1035, 1068-69 (2003) (internal citations omitted).

123.
Indeed, the court has stated that "[i]n view of the rapid advances in science, we recognize
that what may be unpredictable at one point in time may become predictable at a later time." Enzo,
188 F.3d at 1374 n.10.
124.
The doctrine has been traced back to Justice Joseph Story's opinion in Whittemore v.
Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813), in which he wrote that "it could never have been
the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed such a machine merely for
philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to

produce its described effects."
125.
In Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the court held
that the experimental use exception is "truly narrow" and does not protect experiments which
further the legitimate business interests of the alleged infringer. Congress subsequently carved out an
additional exception for generic drugmakers that submit information to the FDA for approval. See
35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000). In Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002), Judge
Arthur J.Gajarsa wrote that "regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged in an
endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate
business and is not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry,
the act does not qualify for the very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense." For
a deeper discussion of the role of the eviscerated experimental use defense in the disclosure function
of patents, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possessionin Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 139-46 (2006).
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seeking a license. Therefore, it is even more imperative that the PTO
scrutinize the disclosure carefully at the outset. Otherwise nonenabled,
invalid patents will proliferate.
6.

Additional Considerations

Finally, identifying the problems with the current framework requires
consideration of specific challenges faced by the Examiner. First, the decisional
law and PTO policies resolve doubts as to patentability in favor of the
applicant,126 which provides an Examiner little incentive to assemble
the substantial evidence required to support a nonenablement rejection.127

See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 BERKELEY
126.
TECH. L.J. 1017, 1019 (2004) ("[T]the systems for patent issuance and patent litigation are tilted in
favor of patent applicants and patent holders."). Christopher Leslie describes how a Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) report reached a similar conclusion:
Evidentiary standards provide an additional obstacle to PTO examiners denying
patent applications. The examiner essentially has the burden of proving nonpatentability
rather than the applicant being compelled to establish patentability. The FTC concluded
in its report that "[tlhe allocation of burden, coupled with examiners' limited ability to
probe applicants' assertions, may explain the significant presumptions that favor applicants
during patent examinations. Many of the key issues are rebuttably presumed in the
applicant's favor." Yet the presumption is extremely difficult to rebut because "the FTO
lacks testing facilities, and assertions that cannot be overcome by documentary evidence
promptly identifiable by the examiner often must be accepted...." [The constraints of
time, information, and evidentiary standards create a situation where "[t]he PTO's
evaluation of a patent may be so poor or hurried as to be near meaningless." The result is
the issuance of invalid patents.
Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101,
108-09 (2006) (quoting FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch.5, at 9 (2003), and Clarisa Long, Patent
Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 667-68 (2002)). During its early years the Federal Circuit took the
opposite position: "[The premise that doubts as to patentability should be resolved in favor of a
patent applicant is now defunct.... Indeed, if patents were issued based on resolving doubts in an
applicant's favor, the presumption of validity would lose its legitimacy." In re Andersen, 743 F.2d.
1578, 1580 (Fed. Cit. 1984) (per curiam).
As one commentator observes, "an examiner faced with a determined applicant has every
127.
incentive to give in and allow the patent." Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse

of PatentContinuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 75 (2004); see also Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges,
Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and
Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 944 (2004) (mentioning

the strategy of "wearing down the examiner" to obtain a patent).
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Second, the PTO's compensation system emphasizes throughput 28 and
favors allowance.129 Current PTO practices reward Examiners for certain
activities and not for others.'30 For example, the first Office Action..' and a
final allowance or rejection "count" toward the Examiner's productivity
quota, but searching the prior art, applicant interviews, other correspondence
with the inventor, and subsequent (including the final) Office Actions do
not.' 2 Indeed, one commentator notes that a savvy Examiner maximizes his
monetary and performance rewards in a particular case by rejecting the
application once, issuing one Office Action, and then allowing it."'
Third, the likelihood of Board reversal likely influences Examiner
behavior. For example, in 2005 the Board affirmed the Examiner in about 55

128.
The amount of time the PTO allots for an Examiner to dispose of a case depends on
factors like seniority and the technology involved. See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective
Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 314 (2001)
(explaining Examiner time management). Thomas estimates that the average time allotment
is between 16 and 17 hours. See id. But see Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the PatentOffice,
95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 n.19 (2001) (providing time estimates from other commentators
and FfO officials which range from 8 to 32 hours, depending on the technology).
129.
See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do
ABOUT IT? 34-35 (2004) ("[The FTO] has become so overtaxed, and its incentives have become so
skewed towards granting patents, that the tests . . . that are supposed to ensure that the patent
monopoly is granted only to true inventors have become largely non-operative."); Farrell & Merges,
supra note 127, at 944-45 (discussing biased procedures at the Patent Office which favor hasty
Examiner analysis and skewed incentives); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577,
609 (1999) (observing that "[tihe current bonus system is believed to skew incentives in favor
of granting patents").
130.
See generally MPEP, supra note 63, § 1705 (describing the procedures for crediting an
Examiner's activities on the Examiner's Case Action Worksheet and the Biweekly Examiner Time
and Activity Report).
131.
An Office Action is an official communication from the FTO stating the Examiner's
position on patentability and the basis for any claim rejections. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2007).
132.
See David Hricik, Aerial Boundaries: The Duty of Candor as a Limitation on the Duty of
Patent Practitioners to Advocate for Maximum Patent Coverage, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 205, 228 (2002)
(explaining that Examiners have a monetary incentive to grant applications and a disincentive to
engage in an extensive prior art search).

133.

See Nikolas

J. Uhlir, Note, Throwing a Wrench in the System: Size-Dependent Properties,

Inherency, and Nanotech Patent Applications, 16 FED. CIR. B.J. 327, 340 n.88 (2006) (explaining
the "count" system). Although final allowances and rejections both count, the incentive system
favors allowance. As Mark Lemley observes, "[E]xaminers must write up reasons for rejection, but
not reasons for allowance, giving them more incentives to allow rather than reject an application."
Lemley, supra note 128, at 1496 n.3; see also Thomas, supra note 128, at 324-25 ("The belief is
widely held that this regime encourages examiners to allow rather than to reject applications.").
Thomas suggests that the current regime represents an effort to close prosecution in a timely
fashion. Id. at 325.

Heightened Enablement

153

percent of cases.' Attorney-Examiner Jeffrey Friedman calculates that there
has been about a 25-fold reduction in the likelihood of affirmance between
1960 and 2002."' Fear of reversal may lead an Examiner to allow marginal
patent applications, which reduces patent quality."' It may also induce
applicants to appeal more frequently, or at least to threaten to do so.'
Fourth, even if the Board sustains an enablement rejection, the level
of deference that the Federal Circuit should afford the PTO's determination of
enablement remains unsettled."' Although the PTO's incentive structure
and the Examiner's time pressures suggest that the facts underlying a patent
grant should be viewed with caution, for a patent denial "the fact-finding
associated with the [Examiner's] analysis is much more likely to be accurate.""'9
This result occurs because the Examiner must support the denial with
technical evidence, which is reviewed by the Board whose members are often

134.
Jeffrey Fredman, Silence Is Not Always Golden: Why Decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences Should Be Precedential, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 859, 865 (2006)
(presenting empirical data).
135.
See id. Fredman argues that since the Federal Circuit tends to affirm the handful of Board
decision it reviews, it is clear that the Board "has incentives to reverse examiners apart from the
merits of the particular case." Id. at 872. These incentives include "reducing the backlog of appeals
by discouraging examiners from responding to appeal briefs, achieving production goals, and
increased likelihood of affirmance at the [Federal Circuit]." Id.
136.
See id.
See Lemley & Moore, supra note 127; Farrell & Merges, supra note 127.
137.
Enablement is a question of law based on underlying factual determinations. In re Swartz,
138.
232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The court reviews the Board's underlying findings of fact for
substantial evidence and reviews its ultimate conclusion whether a disclosure is enabling de novo.
Id.; see also In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1311-16 (Fed. Cit. 2000) (per curiam) (discussing the
standards of review for FTO determinations (citing Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 161-65
(1999) (holding that the Federal Circuit must use the standards set forth in the Administrative
Procedures Act when reviewing findings of fact made by the Patent Office))). Some commentators
argue that the Federal Circuit should apply the framework set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to adjudicate mixed questions of law and fact. See, e.g., Arti
Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO PatentDenials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 199, 221-26 (2000). Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit recently noted that "the Board does not
earn Chevron deference on questions of substantive patent law." Brand v. Miller, 487 F.3d 862, 869
n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 650 (2007). The Federal Circuit's nondeferential view
has emerged over the past two decades:
As we have previously held, the broadest of the FTO's rulemaking powers-35 U.S.C.
§ 6(a)-authorizes the Commissioner to promulgate regulations directed only to 'the conduct
of proceedings before the [FfO]; it does NOT grant the Commissioner the authority to
issue substantive rules.... [Since] Congress has not vested the Commissioner with any
general substantive rulemaking power ... , the rule of controlling deference set forth in
Chevron does not apply.
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting Animal Legal Def.
Fund, 932 F.2d at 930).
139.
Arti K. Rai, Allocating PowerOver Fact-Findingin the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 907, 912 (2004).
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skilled in the relevant law and science.' As Arti Rai argues, this review "is
hardly a rubber stamp for examiner decisions to deny a patent." 4'
C.

The Proposed Framework

1.

The Examiner as Gatekeeper

I propose a new approach to establishing the prima facie case of nonenablement for patent applications in the unpredictable arts.142 This approach
maintains elements of the present framework but allows the Examiner to more
easily satisfy his initial burden under certain conditions. One question that must
be answered at the outset is whether the PTO is the best institutional candidate
to contend with nonenablement. I contend that the Examiner, as the gatekeeper
of the patent system, 4 1 is uniquely poised to derail nonenabled patents for two
reasons. First, as I previously discussed, a PHOSITA cannot test enablement in a
patent post-issuance without risking infringement. " Consequently, the
Examiner becomes the key safeguard in preventing the issuance of nonenabled
(and per se invalid) patents."' Second and relatedly, the PTO as gatekeeper has
140.
"Many Board members ... are experienced former senior examiners. Due to their
technical expertise as well as their opinion writing experience as administrative judges, they are more
than capable of providing the adequate fact finding required by our cases . . ." Gechter v. Davidson,
116 F.3d 1454, 1459 (Fed. Cit. 1997); see also In re Moore, 444 F.2d 572, 574 (C.C.P.A. 1971) ("We
also acknowledge the technical expertise of the individual members of the [B]oard in making findings
of technical fact based upon their own knowledge and experience.").
141.
Rai, supra note 139, at 912.
142.
I agree with Judge Giles S. Rich that the enablement inquiry is highly dependent on the facts of
a particular case. See In re Metcalfe, 410 F.2d 1378, 1382 (C.C.P.A. 1969) ("[Wlhether a given disclosure
which identifies a material to be employed in the practice of the claimed invention is 'enabling' within the
meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 112, must be decided by a rule of reason applied to the facts of the case.").
143.
The patent examiner is a quasi-judicial official. United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128
U.S. 315, 363 (1888) ("The patent ... is the result of a course of proceeding, quasi-judicial in its
character...."); Butterworth v. United States, 112 U.S. 50, 67 (1884) ("That it was intended that
the Commissioner of Patents, in issuing or withholding patents... should exercise quasi-judicial
functions, is apparent from the nature of the examinations and decision he is required to
make. . . ."). Several commentators have recognized the gatekeeping function of the PTO. See, e.g.,
Craig A. Nard, Legitimacy and the Useful Arts, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 515, 541 (1997) (arguing that
the FTO rather than the courts "is better positioned to act as a gatekeeper of the patent and
technological lexicons, with each examiner . .. assuming the role of lexicologist"); John R. Thomas,
On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim
Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REv. 183, 219 (1999) ("Examiners serve as the initial gatekeeper to the
patent system by judging the novelty and nonobviousness of claimed inventions.").
144.
See supra Part II.B.5.
145.
Admittedly, however, the Examiner must deal with nonprocedural issues which adversely
affect claim scope. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 765 (2002). "It is widely suggested that the Patent Office issues patents
that are either 'facially' invalid or broader than the actual innovation disclosed in the patent
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the ability to prevent the public from bearing the cost and burden of litigation to
determine if the disclosure adequately enables the claimed invention.14
The current examination framework is derived from judicial precedent,
which means that change must originate with the Federal Circuit. Assigning
some responsibility to the judiciary is not new or radical, as numerous judges
have hinted over the years at the difficulty in wrestling with unpredictable
fields like chemistry."' This difficulty is an artifact of the judiciary's efforts to
fit chemical inventions into the mold of mechanical-electrical inventions.
My proposed framework mitigates this artifact by shifting the burden of proof
to the applicant when the written description lacks actual experimental
details. I adopt the view that applicants should provide sufficient disclosure
through true testing and experimentation that enables the reproduction of
each claimed embodiment of the invention unless the applicant can show
with clear and convincing evidence that the level of skill in the art would
allow a PHOSITA to achieve the claimed result.149
application. Both problems result from the Patent Office's inability to accurately determine the scope of
information that is already in the public domain or is the subject of other patents (i.e., the relevant prior
art) when examining patent applications." Id.
Cf. Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretationof Claims-American Perspectives,
146.
21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 501 (1990) ("[Tlhe function of claims is to
enable everyone to know, without going through a lawsuit, what infringes the patent and what does
not."). Mark Lemley concisely presents an argument (contrary to his own) for early resolution of the
validity question:
Having to go through litigation to determine validity not only costs a great deal of money,
but it takes quite a bit of time. Indeed, the average time between the issuance of a patent
that would later be litigated and a final decision on its validity in litigation was 8.6 years.
For many patents, the validity decision was not made until thirteen or fourteen years after
the patent issued. During this period, both the patentee and potential infringers. . .are
uncertain about their legal rights. Surely we would be better off knowing sooner rather
than later whether a patent is valid.
Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1520 (2001) (citing Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J.
759, 795 (1999) (advocating a post-patent grant opposition proceeding, which would provide greater
proprietary and competitive certainty ex ante)); see also Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform
and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 42-43 (2007) (explaining that even in cases
where the probability that a patent is invalid is very high, the overall incentive to challenge a patent
is weak due to certain structural features of modem patent litigation).
See, e.g., Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cit. 2005) (noting "that in the
147.
'unpredictable' fields of science, it is appropriate to recognize the variability in the science in
determining the scope of the coverage to which the inventor is entitled").
See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
148.
Under this approach, a PHOSITA should be able to look to the written description in
149.
order to "determine, with reasonable certainty before performing the reaction, whether the claimed
product will be obtained." In re Angstadt, 537'F.2d 498, 502, 507 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Miller, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916)).
Although the law should permit some experimentation, "nothing must be left to speculation
or doubt." In re Eltgroth, 419 F.2d 918, 921 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (affirming the rejection of claims
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Shifting the Burden of Proof and the Primacy of Working Examples

First, I propose that an application which lacks working examples or is
supported by prophetic examples is prima facie nonenabled because it raises
an inference that undue experimentation is required in order to practice the
invention.so In such a case the burden should shift to the applicant to
establish patentability. While the lack of working examples would not
absolutely preclude patentability,"' in order to rebut the prima facie case, the
applicant would have to show that the written description provides some
technique which enables the scope of protection sought by the claims, unless
such knowledge is reasonably accessible to the PHOSITA.'52 If the applicant
fails to rebut the prima facie case, the applicant would be required to amend
the claims to remove the nonenabled subject matter.153

which lacked working examples or any "tangible disclosure"); see also Carlos M. Correa,
PharmaceuticalInventions: When Is the Granting of a PatentJustified?, 1 INT'L. J. INTELL. PROP. MGMT.
4, 12 (2006) (advocating true testing and experimentation).
150.
In In re Strahilevitz, 668 F.2d 1229 (C.C.P.A. 1982), the applicant disclosed no operative
examples in an invention directed to methods and devices for removing antigens from blood. The
Board, in affirming the Examiner's nonenablement rejection, recognized that "[while] specific
examples are not necessary to meet the requirements of Section 112, when present, they do provide
good evidence that the disclosure is enabling and that the invention may be performed without undue
experimentation." Id. at 1231 (emphasis added) (citing In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769 (C.C.P.A. 1962)).
The court did not adopt the Board's heightened standard of review and reversed, but "recognize[d]
that working examples are desirable in complex technologies and that detailed examples can satisfy the
statutory enablement requirement. Indeed, the inclusion of such examples here might well have
avoided a lengthy and, no doubt, expensive appeal." Id. at 1232; see also Capon, 418 F.3d 1349, 1358
(Fed. Cit. 2005).
151.
The applicant might be able to draft a written description in which enablement is "so
apparent as to virtually jump off the page and slap [a PHOSITA] in the face." See Ash v. Tyson
Foods, Inc. 546 U.S. 454, 456-57 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d
695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004)) (evaluating the "jump off the page" standard in the context of an employment discrimination suit).
152.
This language is based in part on an old C.C.P.A. decision:
[T]he inclusion of representative examples is not required to enable a person skilled in the
art to use a generic invention. Nevertheless, an applicant must use some technique of
providing teaching of how to use which is commensurate with the breadth of protection
sought by the claim, unless such knowledge is already available to persons skilled in the art.
In re Fouche, 439 F.2d 1237, 1242 (C.C.P.A. 1971). Further, "where an applicant undertakes to
define his invention by the recitation of a Markush group, he must enable one skilled on the art
to make and use at least one composition employing each member of the Markush group." Id.
153.
However, the applicant could not then amend the written description to introduce new
matter into the application. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2000). The new matter prohibition of 35 U.S.C.
§ 132 and its corollary, the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 "both serve to ensure
that the patent applicant was in full possession of the claimed subject matter on the application filing
date." TurboCare Div. of Demag Delaval Turbomachinery Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 264 F.3d 1111,
1118 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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Similarly, generic claims supported by a single working example' or a
set of nonrepresentative examples'" should raise an inference of undue
experimentation. The Examiner should allow the subgenus claims specifically
enabled by the single working example and reject the unsupported claims
because in unpredictable fields, a PHOSITA cannot extrapolate a result from
one particular embodiment across a broad genus with a reasonable expectation
of success."' To rebut the prima facie case, the applicant would be required
to show that the written description provides some technique which enables
the scope of protection sought by the claims, unless such knowledge is reasonably
accessible to the PHOSITA.'" If the applicant fails to rebut the prima facie
case, the applicant would have to amend the claims to remove the nonenabled
b. matter. 158
subject
A hypothetical example will illustrate the operation of the proposed
framework. Consider a hypothetical patent application directed toward a
new class of pharmaceuticals. The application includes a generic method of
use claim which, by using a structural formula including an array of variables
allowing for the substitution of a countless number of organic functional
groups,' reads on millions of chemical compounds." However, the only
154.
The case of In re Soll, 97 F.2d 623 (C.C.P.A. 1938), illustrates how a single working
example can be insufficient to enable a (small) genus of four compounds. The halogens are a fourmember class of chemical elements (fluorine, chlorine, bromine, and iodine) familiar to most
laboratory scientists. Id. at 624. The applicant attempted to claim the product and process of
reacting a butadiene moiety with a hydrogen halide. Id. at 623. The written description disclosed
the reaction of natural rubber (which contains a butadiene moiety) with hydrogen fluoride. Id. at
624. After noting that the application dealt with an obscure and complex reaction, the Examiner
rejected several broad claims for lack of support "since no implied or direct statements can be found
in the application, as originally filed, that the other hydrogen halides will react similarly to give the
same product." Id. The applicant contended the disclosure of one member of a well-known small
group was sufficient to enable claims covering the entire group. Id. The court affirmed the Board's
rejection, noting that "[c]ertain members of a well-defined group of chemicals may be equivalents for
one purpose and not equivalents for another. Experimentation is required to ascertain the particular
action of a member of the group upon the particular material to be treated . . ." Id. at 625.
155.
For example, if a claim reads on 100 species, the applicant may provide numerous
examples which only enable one or two species. These examples, though many in number, are
"nonrepresentative" of the genus claimed. This is why compliance with the enablement requirement
is not a numbers game. See In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 910 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (explaining that in
satisfying enablement "there is no magical relation between the number of representative examples
and the breadth of the claims").
156.
See supra Part I.B.2.
157.
See supra note 152.
158.
See supra note 153.
159.
See supra note 98 (describing the Markush-type claim).
160.
A functional group is a group of atoms within a molecule that represents a potential
reaction site in an organic compound. Functional groups are responsible for the chemical reactions
of these molecules. See generally RICHARD C. LAROCK, COMPREHENSIVE ORGANIC TRANSFORMATIONS:

A GUIDE TO FUNCTIONAL GROUP PREPARATIONS (Wiley 1999).
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teaching provided in the written description is a handful of working examples
in which only a few of functional groups are substituted. After construing the
claims and assessing the level of skill in the art,"' under the proposed framework
the Examiner would reject the generic claim and only allow a narrower claim
covering the subgenus because:
[Rieplacing a functional group on a chemical compound can often
have highly unpredictable results.... [Elven a change as seemingly
trivial as replacing an isopropyl group with the isosteric cyclopropyl
group .. .could result in either a significant improvement or reduction
in the activity of the compound against a particular biological target.162
The point here is that a PHOSITA cannot extrapolate a result from a few
embodiments across a broad genus with a reasonable expectation of success.'
As stated above, the applicant could rebut the prima facie case of nonenablement with sound scientific reasoning or, alternatively, amend the claims
to remove the nonenabled subject matter.16
Admittedly this proposal substantially heightens the threshold required
to enable a typical claim in unpredictable fields like chemistry and biology. It
incorporates a rethinking of the presumption of enablement and the doctrine
of constructive reduction to practice. This rethinking is crucial in order to
mitigate the disconnect between patent law and science. As I set forth
below, the benefits of this framework outweigh its costs.

161.
Various legal actors disagree about where the enablement analysis should begin. In a
recent opinion, Judge Moore noted that it begins with the disclosure in the specification. Sitrick v.
DreamWorks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 1000 (Fed. Cit. 2008). On the other hand, Dennis Crouch
contends that "enablement should begin with the knowledge of one skilled in the art and move
forward from there." Dennis Crouch, CAFC Continues to Expand Doctrine of Full Scope Development,
PATENT LAW BLOG (PATENTLY-O), Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/02/
establishment-cont.html. In either case, the ultimate question is whether the enablement provided
is commensurate in scope with the protection sought by the claims. See supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
162.
Singh v. Brake, 317 F.3d 1334, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Yasuko
Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 891 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (explaining that with respect to the
enablement of a method-of-treatment claim, a PHOSITA "is well aware that subtle changes in
chemical compounds can radically alter the effects on a human body").
163.
See supra Part 1.B.2.
One commentator explains how a series of narrower claims can solve the problem in
164.
Markush practice: If an applicant's broad claim is rejected,
even if perhaps it covers things that are not operative or because it is so broad that it
inadvertently reads on the prior art, the remedy for that is to have a whole series of
dependent claims. That is why patent applications generally have a number of claims
of decreasing scope.
Milne, supra note 100, at 12.
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How the Proposed Framework Mitigates the Problems

1.

Reconciling Patent Law With Scientific Norms

159

The issue I address in this Article, the inability of the patent laws
to contend with enablement in the unpredictable arts, actually points to a
broader conflict between patent law and the experimental sciences.165 As
several commentators have noted, the conflict arose shortly after World War
II when the rapid increase in inventions emerging from the chemical and
pharmaceutical industries forced the patent system to accommodate these
technologies.'" Yet the basic doctrinal framework, rooted in the applied arts,
had already been set; one commentator has aptly described patents in the
experimental sciences as "a child (or orphan) of mechanical patent law." 67
By requiring true testing and experimentation as proof of enablement,
this proposed framework resolves a striking incongruity between the patent
laws and the norms of scientific research. 6 In science, claims to new
compositions unsupported with actual experimental results are rarely believed.
Stemming in part from the community's duty to exercise critical vigilance
over the claims of its members, a scientist must support findings with actual
experimental details and results, which are usually proffered in replicate.
165.
See, e.g., Qin Shi, Patent System Meets New Sciences: Is the Law Responsive to Changing
Technologies and Industries, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 317, 347 (2005) (exploring the extent to
which the doctrinal framework of the U.S. patent system is capable of dealing with new sciences
and evolving technologies, and proposing that the courts and the PTO "focus their efforts on
understanding the nature and processes of discovery in various evolving technologies...."); Jackie
Hutter, Note, A Definite and Permanent Idea? Invention in the Pharmaceuticaland Chemical
Sciences and the Determination of Conception in Patent Law, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 687, 713-25
(1995) (describing the inherent differences between engineering-related inventions and chemicalbiological inventions).
166.
See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The GrowingComplexity of the United States Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 87-94 (2002) (presenting a historical perspective of the judiciary's
response to the evolution of inventions from agricultural-mechanical to chemical); John Hoxie, A
Patent Attorney's View, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 630, 636 (1965) (contending that the judiciary's
interpretation of the patent statute did not change even when chemical inventions became more
frequent); William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical Technology, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 263, 264-69 (1990)
(exploring the historical role of the patent system's engineering bias in the examination of patent
applications in biological systems and pharmaceutical compounds). Quite curiously, the first patent was
granted to Samuel Hopkins in 1790 for an improved method for making potash (potassium
carbonate), America's first industrial chemical. See U.S. Patent No. Xl (issued July 31, 1790).
167.
Paul H. Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical Patents-A Proposal, 51 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
768, 783 (1969); see also Hoxie, supra note 166, at 636 (explaining that the judiciary tries to fit
chemical inventions into the "mold" of mechanical-electrical inventions).
168.
See Shi, supra note 165, at 347.
169.
See generally JOHN M. ZIMAN, RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE: AN EXPLORATION OF THE
GROUNDS FOR BELIEF INSCIENCE (Cambridge 1978) (investigating the credibility of scientific knowledge
across a range of disciplines).
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Policing occurs through the rigorous scrutiny of peer review,"o which the
Supreme Court even recognizes "is [a] component of 'good science.""' Although
peer review, which has its own shortcomings in the patent examination
context, 2 is not a part of my proposal, peer review and the enablement
requirement likely share at least one goal: to ensure that a skilled artisan can
replicate and practice that which is disclosed."'
2.

Lessening the Administrative Burden of Patent Examination

A key benefit of the new framework is that it would reduce the pendency
of an application in the PTO and accelerate prosecution. First, the Examiner
would require less time to conduct the initial search and to issue the first
Office Action because the Examiner can more easily determine the outer
limits of claim scope when working examples are provided.'
Stated
differently, gauging enablement with actual embodiments saves time because
the Examiner does not need to figure out if the PHOSITA can fill in gaps
omitted from the written description."'
Second and relatedly, limiting the presumption of enablement and
narrowing the doctrine of constructive reduction to practice should induce
170.
Peer review "is quite efficient at screening out papers that are too speculative or where
there are serious errors in the design of the study or in the analysis of data." KENNETH R. FOSTER &
PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 171
(1997). For a more in-depth discussion of peer review in science, see ELIZABETH WAGER ET AL.,
HOwTO SURVIVE PEER REVIEW 1 (2002) (describing the concept of peer review, noting that
although it is an "important milestone[ ] of funding and publication, the concept of critical discussion
of ideas and findings runs through the entire scientific process"). See generally PEER REVIEW IN
HEALTH SCIENCES (Fiona Godlee & Tom Jefferson eds., 2d ed. 2003).
171.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (citations omitted).
172.
For example, one commentator argues that peer review suppresses innovation.
See David F. Horrobin, The PhilosophicalBasis of Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 1438, 1438-41 (1990) (arguing that peer review fails to recognize the work
of innovators who are often erratic, unsystematic, and difficult to work with).
173.
One commentator makes a strong argument for peer review in the patent process. See
Beth Simone Noveck, "Peer to Patent": Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 123, 125 (2006) (asserting that the patent examiner's inability to communicate
with the scientific community leads to institutionalized isolation of expertise which adversely
affects patent quality). However, a key distinction between peer review and the current framework
is that peer review focuses on work that has been done, not on speculative results. Nonetheless, even
research grant proposals, which are inherently speculative because they propose research, often
include some actual experimental results because "it is virtually impossible to obtain a favorable
review without strong preliminary data." National Cancer Institute: Quick Guide for Grant
Applications, http://deainfo.nci.nih.gov/extra/extdocs/gntapp.htm#9 (last visited June 19, 2007).
See Nat'l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190,
174.
1196 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that "[tihe scope of the claims must 'be less than or equal to the
scope of the enablement').
175.
See supra Part L.A (discussing the PHOSITA's ability to fill in gaps in unpredictable technologies).
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applicants to draft claims more precisely, meaning that there should be a closer
correspondence between the disclosed embodiments and claim breadth.
Applicants will be less inclined to draft claims reading on millions or billions of
embodiments because it is unlikely that the applicant can provide enough working
examples to support claims of that breadth. This should result in a shift toward
narrower claiming, which would simplify and shorten the Examiner's search.
Ill.
A.

POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

The Incentive to Innovate

One oft-cited justification for the current enablement standard is that it
fosters innovation. Judge Newman, for example, argues that a patentee's
obligation to disclose should not destroy the incentive to innovate:
As implemented by the patent statute, the grant of the right to exclude
carries the obligation to disclose the workings of the invention,
thereby adding to the store of knowledge without diminishing the
patent-supported incentive to innovate.
But the obligation to disclose is not the principal reason for a patent

system .... The reason ... isto encourage innovation and its fruits ....

176

Supporters of this view believe that the patent system must offer companies
sufficient incentives to develop new products, to attract investors, and to earn
a profit.'7 7 To that end "the patent law[s] place[ I strong pressure on filing the
patent application early in the development of the technology, often before
the commercial embodiment is developed or all of the boundaries [are] fully

176.
Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc); see also Hormone
Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990). "There cannot,
in an effective patent system, be such a burden placed on the right to broad claims. To restrict
appellants to the [specific embodiment] disclosed ... would be a poor way to stimulate invention,
and particularly to encourage its early disclosure." Id. (quoting In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 601-06
(C.C.P.A. 1977)). But see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974) (explaining
that the purpose of the patent system is trifold, including promoting disclosure of inventions,
which stimulates further innovation, and permitting the public to practice the invention once the
patent expires); see also Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118
HARV. L. REv. 2007 (2005) (examining the value of the patent system's disclosure function).
177.
See Lita Nelsen, The Role of University Technology Transfer Operations in Assuring Access to
Medicines and Vaccines in Developing Countries, 3 YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 301, 301
(2003) (arguing that patent protection is necessary "to provide the incentive for industrial participation"
in drug discovery); Dana Rohrabacher & Paul Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 263, 271 (1995) (explaining that the patent system acts as a strong shield to protect
pharmaceutical and biotechnological innovation and "thus maintaining the incentive for the
investment of venture capital in research and development").
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explored.""' Admittedly the patent laws actually penalize inventors who fail
to file promptly." 9 Thus, it is a concern that a heightened enablement
standard would delay entry into the patent system because the inventor
would require more time in research and development.'
Another concern is that allowing the applicant to claim only those
embodiments actually realized would decrease the value of patents:
At first blush it might seem to make sense to limit the rights of
a patentee to only those embodiments of the invention ... that she
has actually created at the time the patent application is filed. But
imitators would soon find some minor variation over the disclosed
embodiments... [which would give them] a nonenablement defense

Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
178.
(en banc) (per curiam) (Newman, J., concurring), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); see also
Edlyn S. Simmons, Prior Art Searching in the Preparationof PharmaceuticalPatent Applications, DRUG
DISCOVERY TODAY, Feb. 1998, at 52, 52 (explaining the importance of drafting broad generic claims
which includes hypothetical related compounds in order to prevent competitors from developing
them). Drug companies, for example, often seek broad patents early in the drug discovery process,
long before a marketable form of the drug is identified or tested. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role
of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 345, 349 (2007) (discussing
the role of the patent system in drug development). However, it is true that pharmaceutical and
biotech companies "must file patent applications early in the development stage to avoid the
statutory bar effect of their public use clinical trials." Stephen T. Schreiner & Patrick A. Doody,
Patent Continuation Applications: How the PTO's Proposed New Rules Undermine an Important Part of
the U.S. Patent System With Hundreds of Years of History, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 556,
557 (2006). Early patenting has drawbacks, which include loss of patent term and market erosion.
See Bryan L. Walser, Shared Technical Decisionmakingand the Disaggregationof Sovereignty: International
Regulatory Policy, Expert Communities, and the MultinationalPharmaceuticalIndustry, 72 TUL. L. REV.
1597, 1647-48 (1998) (exploring the incentives for drug companies to reduce the time required to
bring new compounds to market due to market erosion).
For example, an applicant must file a patent application within one year of disclosing the
179.
invention in a printed publication. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Likewise, if the invention is used in
public, sold, or subject to an offer for sale in the United States, the applicant must file within one
year of the event. Id. A fundamental purpose of the § 102(b) "statutory bar" is to encourage prompt
filing. See Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
("Section 102(b) ... is primarily concerned with the policy that encourages an inventor to enter the
); see also ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE
patent system promptly.
2
GUIDE 117-18 (2004) (explaining the three-fold policy rationale for § 102(b)). Section 10 (g) also
functions to "penalize[ ] the unexcused delay or failure of a first inventor to share the 'benefit of the
knowledge of [the] invention' with the public after the invention has been completed." Checkpoint
Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 54 F.3d 756, 761 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting Paulik v. Rizkalla,
760 F.2d at 1280 (Rich, J., concurring)). Mark Lemley explains that "[bly waiting too long to file a
patent application or inventing without giving the world the benefit of the invention, inventors lose
not only their own rights to file for a patent but also the ability to prevent a second inventor who
does give the world the benefit of the invention from obtaining her own patent." Mark A. Lemley &
Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1102 (2003).
This potential delay is in tension with the idea that "le]arly public disclosure is a linchpin
180.
of the patent system." W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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if the patentee tried to enforce the patent. Such a rule would soon render
181
patents useless.
The real issue underlying both concerns is the problem of generic claiming. It is
true that the current framework allows a patentee to obtain a broad claim with a
minimal amount of disclosure, which means that he only needs to undertake
a minimal amount of experimentation before entering the patent system.18
There are several responses to these concerns. First, under the proposed
framework, an applicant can still claim an invention generically, meaning that in
every case he need not provide a working example for every species encompassed
by a generic claim.' The amount of disclosure required will depend on the
size of the genus and the characteristics of the individual species:
It appears to be well settled that a single species can rarely, if ever,
afford sufficient support for a generic claim. The decisions do not
however fix any definite number of species which will establish
completion of a generic invention and it seems evident therefrom that
such number will vary, depending on the circumstances of particular
cases. Thus, in the case of a small genus . .. consisting of four species,
a reduction to practice of three, or perhaps even two, might serve to
complete the generic invention, while in the case of a genus comprising
hundreds of species, a considerably larger number of reductions to
practice would probably be necessary.1 4

181.
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 839, 845 (1990). Judge Arthur J. Gajarsa holds a similar view:
Enablement does not require the inventor to foresee every means of implementing an
invention at pains of losing his patent franchise. Were it otherwise, claimed inventions
would not include improved modes of practicing those inventions. Such narrow patent
rights would rapidly become worthless as new modes of practicing the invention developed,
and the inventor would lose the benefit of the patent bargain.
Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also SRI Int'l v.
Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("The law does not
require the impossible [in that] it does not require that an applicant describe in his specification every
conceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention."); Lever Bros. Co. v. Procter &
Gamble Mfg. Co., 139 F.2d 633, 638 (4th Cir. 1943) (explaining that "it is both impracticable
and unreasonable to require [the applicant] to set out an extended list of precise combinations and
formulae with specific designation of the exact characteristics [obtained]").
182.
See supra Parts II.A and II.B.
183.
See In re Grimme, 274 F.2d 949, 952 (C.C.P.A. 1960) ("It is manifestly impracticable for
an applicant who discloses a generic invention to give an example of every species falling within
it."). But "there must be sufficient disclosure, either through illustrative examples or terminology, to
teach those of ordinary skill how to make and how to use the invention as broadly as it is claimed."
In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 496 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
184.
In re Shokal, 242 F.2d 771, 773 (1957) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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This illustrates that the proposal affords flexibility in the number of working
examples required."'
Second and conversely, generic claims can thwart innovation. The
Supreme Court recognized this long ago in an infringement suit involving
licenses to use Thomas Edison's lamp:
[To hold that one who had discovered that a certain fibrous or textile
material answered the required purpose, should obtain the right to exclude
everybody from the whole domain of fibrous and textile materials, and
thereby shut out any further efforts to discover a better specimen of
that class than the patentee had employed, would be an unwarranted
extension of his monopoly, and operate rather to discourage than to
promote invention.

In this vein, I contend that the proposed framework does not thwart innovation.
Rather, by using the inventor's actual experimental details to limit claim
scope, the new framework will promote invention by allowing other scientists
who are trying to elucidate how to make and use the claimed invention while
the purported inventor does not know how to do so."'
B.

The Narrow Teaching Function of a Patent

Patents are difficult to understand."' Although esoteric language and
formalism certainly contribute," 9 I believe that the current framework's minimal
185.
Indeed, there are instances where "[cihemists knowing the properties of one member of a
series would in general know what to expect in adjacent members" because chemically related species
often behave similarly. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 522 n.3 (1966) (quoting In re Henze, 181
F.2d 196, 200-01 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (applying this rule to homologous compounds, which is a family
of chemical compounds which vary from member to member by a methylene group)). There is also a
belief that there are instances where a limited disclosure may be preferable. See In re Cavallito, 282
F.2d 363, 367 (C.C.P.A. 1960) ("If a claim covers compounds which are closely related, a comparatively
limited disclosure may be sufficient to support it" because a limited disclosure "may be of greater
value in determining the patentable characteristics of the claimed compounds than a more extensive
disclosure would be."). That said, there are also cases where a single working example is insufficient
to enable a small genus. See supra note 154 and accompanying text; see also Herbert H. Goodman,
The Invalidation of Generic Claims by Inclusion of a Small Number of Inoperative Species, 40 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 745 (1958) (outlining several problems which arise in drafting chemical claims involving
inductive reasoning from limited examples).
Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465,476 (1895) (emphasis added).
186.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the chilling effect).
187.
See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 166, at 134-44 (exploring how the increasing
188.
complexity of patents may be due in part to the changes in the nature of technologies being
patented); Note, supra note 176, at 2022 (explaining that patents "are notoriously hard to interpret"
(quoting Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful

Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L.REv. 53, 102-03 (2001))).
See, e.g., Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-TradeSecret Decision: An IndustrialPerspective, 78
189.
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 689, 713-14 (1996) (observing that chemical patents tend to be
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enablement threshold stymies a patent's potential to provide substantive
scientific information. Below I address concerns that patents do and should
have only a narrow teaching function."'
The first such concern relates to the intended audience for which the
patent document is written. Although the public is the ultimate beneficiary
of the disclosure,'9 Judge Newman has explained that patents are written to
enable a PHOSITA, and not the general public, to practice the invention.'92
Her view is that the written description should not contain known scientific
information because it would greatly enlarge its size, increase the cost of
patent prosecution, and "obfuscate rather than highlight the contribution to
which the patent is directed."' It is probably true that the PTO, jurists, and
members of the patent bar would not embrace thicker patent documents.'

"shrouded" in chemical nomenclature, which makes them hard to comprehend); see also Kelly Casey
Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REv. 333, 379
(2007) (explaining that the inventor's difficulty in describing the invention carries forward to the
subsequent reader). Sometimes a patentee purposely drafts an instrument which is hard to
understand. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1029 & n.52 (1989) (suggesting that some patentees
deliberately suppress crucial information, and that many published patents are of little use to others
as a result of suppression).
190.
See Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int'l, Inc., 835 F.2d 1419, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("The
written description must communicate that which is needed to enable the [person having ordinary
skill in the art] to make and use the claimed invention.").
191.
The teaching and claim scope functions of the enablement requirement are necessary "in
order to give the public, after the privilege shall expire, the advantage for which the privilege is
allowed, and is the foundation of the power to issue a patent." Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
218, 219 (1832).
See, e.g., Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1119 (Fed. Cit. 2002)
192.
(explaining that patent documents are meant to be "a concise statement for persons in the field");
Ajinomoto Co. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (explaining
that a patent "is not a scientific treatise, but a document that presumes a readership skilled in the
field of the invention").
Ajinomoto, 228 F.3d at 1347. "[Although] an applicant for a patent [must] give to the
193.
public a complete and adequate disclosure in return for the patent grant, the certainty required of
the disclosure is not greater than that which is reasonable.... [Ilt cannot be forgotten that the
disclosure is not addressed to the public generally, but to those skilled in the art." In re Storrs, 245
F.2d 474, 478 (C.C.P.A. 1957); see also A.B. Dick Co. v. Barnett, 288 F. 799, 801 (2d Cit. 1923)
("[Tihe specification of a patent is not addressed to people who are ignorant about the matter . . .").
194.
Judge Giles S. Rich expresses the opinion that "[n]ot every last detail is to be described,
else patent specifications would turn into production specifications, which they were never intended
to be. United States specifications have often been criticized as too cluttered with details to give an
easy understanding of what the invention really is." In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 774 (C.C.P.A. 1962);
accord N. Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 941 (Fed. Cit. 1990) ("It is not fatal if
some experimentation is needed, for the patent document is not intended to be a production
specification."). Also, the PTO charges additional filing fees for patent specifications which exceed a
threshold page count or claim count. See 35 U.S.C. § 41 (a)(1)(B) (2000).
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The second concern, advanced by Timothy Holbrook, is that structural
flaws in the patent system itself inhibit the ability of a patent to perform a
teaching function.9 For example, he contends that the Federal Circuit's
evisceration of the common law experimental-use exception means that
"[o]ne can read the patent but cannot make or use the invention for purposes
of exploring its function or the manner in which it works" without risking
infringement.' Holbrook also describes how the teachings in the disclosure
are often untimely due to delays in publication.'97 Holbrook concludes that
even if persons in several fields consult the patent for technical information,
the disclosure plays a limited teaching role, particularly if the patentee
publishes the information in another medium.'98
I have several responses to these concerns. First, I agree with Judge Pauline
Newman that the patent's disclosure is directed at a limited audience. Although
the written description should not become a scientific treatise, in many ways a
scientific publication and the written description share similar goals, namely to
disclose something novel,"' to teach fellow artisans how to replicate the
invention or discovery,2 " and to spur further innovation in the field.20 '
Second, one long-term consequence of my proposal is that the written
description will eventually resemble the experimental section of a scientific
publication.zo This is the first step toward the broader goal to bridge the
disconnect between patent law and the experimental sciences. So while
the proposed framework cannot and is not intended to fix every problem with
patent law's disclosure function, it would mitigate these problems by transforming
Timothy R. Holbrook, Possessionin Patent Law, 59 SMU L.REV. 123, 139-46 (2006).
195.
Id. at 139-40.
196.
Id. at 143.
197.
198.
Id. at 146 (describing how patents can provide a "feedback loop to encourage teachings via
pre-patent disclosures and publications").
199.
Rebecca Eisenberg argues that both the scientific community and the patent system favor
full disclosure. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 217 (1987).
See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 922 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
200.
("[The role of the specification is to teach, both what the invention is (written description) and how
to make and use it (enablement).").
201.
See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that a
patent's addition of knowledge is so important to the public good "that the Federal Government is
willing to pay the high price of ... years of exclusive use for its disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed,
will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further significant advances in the art"); Charles
E. Smith, Requirements for PatentingChemical Intermediates: Do They Accomplish the Statutory Goals?,
29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 191, 192 n.7 (1984) ("The very purpose of this disclosure to the public is to
catalyze other inventors into activity and make possible additional advances in the art." (citing Ex parte
Hull, 191 U.S.P.Q. 157, 159 (Bd. App. 1975))).
In the experimental sciences, peer-reviewed journal publications have an experimental
202.
section which includes working examples and other experimental details.
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the written description into an instructional tool. Specifically, including
working examples combined with some discussion of what is already known
serves a teaching role because together they provide context203 and allow the
PHOSITA to more precisely and to more quickly replicate the invention
d.204
or discovery.
CONCLUSION
The enablement requirement ensures that the public will obtain some
benefit in return for the patent holder's right to exclude. One hoped-for benefit
is that the teachings of patent disclosures will induce other inventors to
innovate. When a patent issues with nonenabled claims, it prevents other
scientists who are trying to elucidate how to make and use the claimed invention
while the inventor does not know how to do so. By requiring working examples
and actual experimental results as proof of enablement, this proposal
mitigates this problem and resolves a striking incongruity between the patent
laws and the norms of scientific research. It guarantees that the PHOSITA,
armed with the written description, can make and use the claimed invention
without excessive time or labor. But this proposal is only the beginning of an
effort to harmonize the patent laws with science. As the number of annual
patent applications emerging from the biotech, nanotech, and pharmaceutical

203.
This proposal points to another disconnect between law and science. In the realmof
scientific publishing, the author-scientist must demonstrate an understanding of the underlying
science (which is policed through peer review). By contrast, patent law is insensitive to the
inventor's comprehension of the underlying science. See In re Libby, 255 F.2d 412, 415 (C.C.P.A.
1958) ("It is not necessary that a patentee should understand the scientific principles underlying his
invention, so long as he makes a sufficient disclosure to enable other persons skilled in the art to
practice the invention.").
204.
This proposal would be a marked departure from a well-settled principle. See Loom Co. v.
Higgins, 105 U.S. 580, 586 (1881) ("He may begin at the point where his invention begins, and
describe what he has made that is new, and what it replaces of the old."). I contend that a
PHOSITA should not have to engage in laborious experimentation. In In re Gardner, 427 F.2d 786
(C.C.P.A. 1970), a case in which the court affirmed the Board's rejection of claims related to an
alleged antidepressant activity in pharmaceutical compounds due to nonenablement, Judge Giles S.
Rich rejected the appellants' argument that the PHOSITA must figure out how to use the invention:
In other words, [the appellants argue that] those skilled in the art, by investigations
along the above lines, and by a great amount of work, can eventually find out how to use
appellants' invention. But our view is that the law requires that the disclosure in the application
shall inform them how to use, not how to find out how to use for themselves. The above
argument is self-defeating. It demonstrates the inadequacy of the disclosure by saying, in
effect: We have detected and disclosed the presence of activity; if you wish to practice our
invention, go and find out how to use it.
Id. at 789.
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industries continue to rise, this increase will spur more debate about the
patent system's ability to adapt to new sciences and emerging technologies.

